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I. INTRODUCTION
As the need for alternative income sources for international banking
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institutions increases with the decline of traditional lending activities,' de-
rivative trading has become a significant source of profitable activity.2
Banks have participated in this highly speculative, risk allocating, en-
deavor in a search for expanded client bases and financial service prod-
ucts. 3 The recent Barings and Daiwa scandals demonstrate some of the
problems associated with volatile financial products. Both external man-
agement interaction with local market exchange trading systems and their
bureaucracy, compounded by internal management controls that promote
profit-seeking activity to the detriment of effective supervisory manage-
ment control procedures, warrant an international response to regulation
in this area.4
Recent negotiations on the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) and America's protestations to a multilateral financial service
agreement' illustrate problems with the existing international framework
to develop appropriate derivative regulatory policy. Moreover, any unilat-
eral efforts to regulate the use of derivative products will not only frus-
trate an international financial service agreement, but will be ineffective
to deal with future Barings-type crises. 6 Uniformity in risk valuation and
accounting standards, 7 along with an incentive structure that encourages
management compliance with "preferred" internal controls,' necessitates
1. See Laurence H. Summers, G-7 Expects A Global Currency Shift, INVESTOR'S
Bus. DAILY, May 1, 1995, at B1.
2. See, e.g., Joe R. Shuman, Global Perspectives: The International Competitiveness
of U.S. Banks, 77 J. CoM. LENDING 10 (Aug. 1995).
3. See Justin Fox, Basel Committee to Grapple with Market Risk at Meeting, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 27, 1995, at 4.
4. Id. See also Peter Neilsen, Banks Must Set Aside Capital for Market Risk-BIS,
REuTERs. BC CYCLE, Apr. 12, 1995, available in NEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
5. See, e.g., SIA Treasury Committed to Financial Reform, Trade Liberalization,
Summer Tells SIA, BNA BANKING DAILY, Mar. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, Bna Library,
BNABD File; see also Treasury Sees Progress, But Continuing Barriers to U.S. Banking
Abroad, BANKING POL'Y REPORT, Jan. 16, 1995.
6. See generally STEPHEN FAY, THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS (1997) (highlighting the
role of local regulatory laxity and poor management supervision in improper trading ac-
tivity). See also Derivatives: Regulatory Compatibility Needed in Global Market, Dial
Says, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, April 14, 1997, available in LEXIS, Itrade Library,
BNAIBF File (discussing Commodity Futures Trading Commissioner Joseph Dial's con-
cem for unified, minimum regulatory standards to protect the global marketplace).
7. See generally International Accounting Standards Panel Accelerates Release of
Rules, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Apr. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, Itrade Library,
BNAIBF File; Alistair Osborne, Guide draws on horror cases; Coopers & Lybrand offers
GARP, a risk-control checklist, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 2, 1996, Bus. Sec., at 2
(discussing Generally Accepted Risk Principles (GARP) and its role in risk management
of financial derivatives).
8. Brent McClintock, International Financial Instability and the Financial Deriva-
1997]
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the expansion of the GATS to harmonize the regulatory policies of ex-
isting international institutions 9 that promulgate standards for international
financial market participants.
This article evaluates the role of derivative trading in the Barings
Crisis, its potential impact on regulatory developments, and a "potential"
international solution. Part II of the article analyzes the role of derivative
products in financial transactions and defines their role in the conveyance
of market information and the allocation of market risk. Part III outlines
the Barings crisis and how exchange rules and management structure and
procedure facilitated unauthorized trading activity. Part IV of the article
describes the role of derivative products in American banking institutions
and the U.S. regulation that governs such transactions. It also details the
current regulatory schemes for risk-based capital standards for which the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the U.S. Federal Reserve
Bank are advocating. Part V describes the evolution of America's current
position on the Financial Service Agreement of the GATS and its pejora-
tive impact on supranational banking developments. Finally, Part VI of
the article argues that the GATS should be expanded to include a
clearinghouse that harmonizes existing settlement systems, such as
SWIFT, FEDWIRE, and clearinghouses that affect exchange-traded deriv-
atives. It also analyzes the costs and benefits of a GATS-based clearing-
house and its potential impact on U.S. and international derivative
products.
II. THE ROLE OF DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS
Unlike previous legal scholarship'0 about the growth of derivative
tives Market, 30 J. ECON. ISSUES 13, 26 (1996) (commenting about the Bank of England's
observations on the Barings collapse). See also Daniel Dunaief, Banks' Monitoring of De-
rivatives Risk Gets Qualified Praise, AM. BANKER, May 19, 1995, at 20.
9. See Banking: Commission Proposes Improvements to Supervisory Rules, RAPID,
May 2, 1996, available in NEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File (detailing the European
Commission's proposals for derivatives regulations in light of Bank of International Set-
tlements' new proposals).
10. See generally Sheila C. Bair, Lessons from the Barings Collapse, 64 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1 (1995); Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the
Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEx. L. REV. 985 (1995) [hereinafter
Hu, Hedging Expectations]; Bernard J. Karol, Regulation of Financial Derivatives: An
Overview of Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 195
(1995); Marc Levy, Japanese and U.S. Financial Derivatives Markets: Recommendations
for Loosening Japan's Tightly Regulated Market, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1970 (1995);
Thomas C. Singher, Regulating Derivatives: Does Transnational Regulatory Cooperation
Offer A Viable Alternative to Congressional Action?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L. 1397 (1995);
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trading in financial markets, this article will develop a functional defini-
tion of a derivative product that can best explain the role of derivatives
in the Barings collapse. This definition will explain why Barings, like
other financial institutions, utilized derivatives in their financial manage-
ment and how Barings, unlike other financial institutions, exploited deriv-
atives to expand its international operations."
A. A Functional Definition for Derivative Instruments in
International Transactions
A derivative is a financial device that permits its holder to transfer
risk through alternative timing of financial payments. 12 The financial de-
vice usually takes the form of a contractual agreement, 3 privately 14 or
publicly traded, 5 between two or more parties that obligates them to ex-
change specified currency payments.' 6 An underlying asset or market in-
Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Cause of Informational Failure and
Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457 (1993) [hereinafter Hu, Mis-
understood Derivatives].
11. See infra notes 137-46 and accompanying discussion.
12. See, e.g., Scott P. Mason, The Allocation of Risk, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM: A FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 153 (Harvard Business School, Global Financial
System Project, ed. 1995).
13. These contracts are categorized into four basic groups:
Forward A contract obligating one party to buy and the other to sell, a specific asset
for a fixed price at a future date.
Futures A forward contract that is standardized and exchange traded.
Option A contract between two parties, which gives one party the right, but not the
obligation to buy or sell an asset, currency or rate for a specified price.
Swap An agreement by two parties to exchange a series of cash flows . . . in the
future.
KPMG, SOLVING THE MYSTERY OF DERIVATIVES 94 (1994).
14. Individually arranged, non-standardized, forward and option contracts are traded
on the Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets. These instruments usually have longer maturities
and less liquidity than exchange-traded contracts. Id. at 33.
15. Standardized contracts are traded on organized exchanges that operate as clear-
inghouses for the buyer and seller of such instruments. For example, national exchanges
that conduct international transactions include the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME),
the London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE), and the Singapore Interna-
tional Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). These exchanges help to exploit pricing and valua-
tion inconsistencies with forward contracts caused by interest rates, taxation, and foreign
exchange risks. Exchange-traded markets total one half the size of the OTC markets. Id.
at 33-37.
16. Id. at 94 (defining derivative as "a financial instrument that derives its cash
flows, and therefore its value, by its value to an underlying instrument, index, or
reference").
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dicia, like interest rates, 17 foreign exchange rates, 8 or specific market in-
dices,' 9 affect the stream of these payments. Investors, with highly
specialized financial objectives,20 and financial institutions, with high
credit ratings,21 comprise the majority of participants in the derivatives
market.
The rudimentary components of most derivative products include an
exchange market, its client base, and its settlement systems and proce-
dures. Each component attracts investors and serves their financial objec-
tives, as well as contributes to the overall risk associated with such de-
rivative products.
1. Derivatives Markets
The growth of derivative markets can be considered a response to
specific transaction-demand. The establishment of the Chicago Board of
Trade and the trading of its futures contracts, for example, have been at-
tributed to problems in the early nineteenth century grain market. 22 Simi-
larly, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Accord and its impact on the
stability of foreign exchange rates can be considered an influence on the
expansion of the London International Financial Futures Exchange
(LIFFE)23 and the Tokyo International Financial Futures Exchange
(TIFFE)24 and their respective futures contracts.
Such transaction demands can also be attributed to the role of deriv-
ative products in finance and industry. For example, the presence of for-
ward contracts in the foreign exchange market represents industry's need
17. Id. at 95 (describing a forward rate agreement (FRA) as "an agreement to ex-
change dollar amounts at a specified future date based on the difference between a partic-
ular interest rate index and an agreed fixed rate").
18. Id. (describing a forward foreign exchange contract as "a contract to pay or re-
ceive specific amounts of currency at a future date in exchange for another currency at an
agreed-upon exchange rate").
19. Id. at 3 (describing Equity Index Futures as contracts that are based on an agree-
ment for a cash settlement between one party and a specified exchange).
20. See, e.g., Singher, supra note 10, at 1404, nn.40-46 (discussing the dominant
presence of corporations, governmental entities, institutional investors, and financial insti-
tutions in the derivatives markets).
21. See id. at 1404-05, nn.47-56 (detailing the need for financial intermediaries with
substantial capital and credit appraisal experience, excellent credit standing, and invest-
ment grade credit ratings).
22. See Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds," "General Custer," and The Reg-
ulation of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 6, n.15 (1994)
(commenting about supply and demand inefficiencies with Midwestern farm products).
23. See KPMG, supra note 13, at 36.
24. Id. at 37.
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to hedge against price fluctuations in international transactions. 25 Deriva-
tives markets assist in the valuation of these contracts through integrating
market risk and information on price equilibria.
26
The characteristics of each market reflect the unique attributes of its
traded derivative instruments. For example, the Over-the-Counter (OTC)
market and its derivative products are less liquid than exchange markets
due to the limited secondary market for such products. OTC products are
generally individually arranged contracts, known as non-standardized
contracts, and, as such, are left mostly unregulated.27 Moreover, the com-
position of markets determines the jurisdictional boundaries of regula-
tions to which they are subject38
Disequilibria between expectations and market performances have
created some significant economic losses for traders and clients.29 The
ability to minimize such market risk30 in a transaction is very difficult to
control.3 Numerous factors, both anticipated and unanticipated, 2 cannot
25. See, e.g., Salomon Forex v. Tauber, 795 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd, 8
F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1031 (1994) (illustrating an investor's use
of foreign currency exchange contracts, as well as the financial institution's failure to
minimize legal risk under the Commodities Exchange Act).
26. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 10, at 1464-66. See also U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 34 (GAO/GGD - 94-133, May 1994). Future contracts are used prima-
rily in the foreign exchange market for hedging against price fluctuations in international
transactions. The valuation of the forward contracts depends upon anticipated market risks
and projected price levels. The economics of the forward contract can best explain its risk
allocating capacity. For example, if an investor believes the price of a commodity will be
X in 90 days and the price is X in 90 days, then he can exercise his option at that time
to buy or sell the underlying asset. For an excellent brief summary of the benefits of fu-
ture contracts, see Levy, supra note 10, at 1970, 2000-02 & nn.208-20.
27. See KPMG, supra note 13, at 33-34.
28. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 10, at 2008-10 (discussing exchange market opera-
tions in the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations over se-
curities-based derivatives and the role of the Commodities and Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC) over commodities- and futures-based derivatives).
29. See McClintock, supra note 8, at 23-29 (outlining the major stories from 1990
through 1995); see also Laurie Morse, Survey of Derivatives, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1995,
at 2 (discussing high-profile derivatives losses by Barings, Metallgesellschaft, and Orange
County).
30. See, e.g., KPMG, supra note 13, at 102 (defining market risk as the risk that
fluctuations in market prices and conditions can affect the book or market value of finan-
cial instruments, commodities, or other assets or liabilities).
31. Control problems arise from the highly leveraged nature of derivative instru-
ments and their vulnerability to small changes in interest rates, equity prices, or exchange
rates. See, e.g., McClintock, supra note 8, at 24 (citing Merrill Lynch's $377 million loss
in mortgage-backed securities market for its failure to hedge against rising interest rates).
32. See id. (commenting about a $6.4 billion bet by Showa Shell Seikiyu in the cur-
1997]
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be entirely controlled without incurring huge transaction costs that can
greatly reduce investment returns.33 Hedging strategies, 34 or combinations
thereof,35 help traders to protect against the net exposures of their
portfolios. 36
The distribution of risk throughout international derivative markets
has become a hallmark of most derivative trading. 37 The incentive for
participation in international markets also comes from arbitrage 3 oppor-
tunities that can be exploited between markets.39 Rather than assuming all
the risk associated with a particular exchange, trading products on nu-
merous exchanges prevents against exposure to systemic risks 4° that may
be indigenous to a particular exchange.4
Liquidity is a major concern for any international derivative trader.42
rency futures markets that cost the firm $1.1 billion, caused by the U.S. dollar's unantici-
pated decline).
33. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 10, at 1467 (highlighting the im-
pact of adverse market movements in the swap market and associated avoidance costs).
34. Hedging strategies are defined as "[u]ndertaking transactions or contractual
agreements for the purpose of reducing exposure to one or more types of business risk."
KPMG, supra note 13, at 103.
35. Some variations of hedging strategies include: a "cap," where an option contract
can be used to protect against fluctuations in interest rates or some underlying indicies;
and a "cylinder," where foreign currency options are simultaneously purchased with dif-
ferent strike prices. Id. at 96-97. Another popular hedging strategy, known as the "delta-
neutral strategy," requires the purchase of a quantity of options whose changes in valua-
tion mirror the price movements of the underlying instrument. See, e.g., id. at 97; see
also Mason, supra note 12, at 162-67 (commenting about the relationship between hedg-
ing strategies, investors, and derivatives markets).
36. Id.
37. See McClintock, supra note 8, at 28 (citing the role of derivatives in improving
linkages between domestic and international financial markets); see generally The Limits
of Self-Regulation, FiN. REG. REPORT, Nov. 1995, available in LEXIS, Bankg Library,
CURNWS File [hereinafter Limits of Self-Regulation] (detailing the globalization of the
derivatives markets).
38. Arbitrage is defined as "[t]he practice of derivatives traders to execute numerous
transactions simultaneously to exploit market inefficiencies and to profit accordingly."
KPMG, supra note 13, at 103.
39. See infra Part II.B.
40. Systemic risk represents the vulnerability of the financial system to shocks. See,
e.g., McClintock, supra note 8, at 26; see also BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETrLEMENTS,
REPORT OF THE COMMTEE ON INTERBANK NETTING SCHEMES OF THE GROUP OF TEN
COuNTRIEs 9 (1990) (defining systemic risk as the susceptiblity of the entire market to
the failure of one financial institution and its impact on the market's overall liquidity).
41. These risks can arise from numerous factors. See, e.g., McClintock, supra note
8, at 26 (commenting about the domination of certain derivatives markets by few market-
makers and its potential impact on systemic risk).
42. See id. at 26-27.
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The liquidity risk in a derivative product that concerns a trader covers
the timing of the sale or the purchase of a product's quantity at a fair
price.43 The faster a derivative can be sold on an exchange, the greater
the chance to avoid a loss.44
A product's liquidity risk alters three major parameters for derivative
markets. First, the innovation of derivative products with faster mark-to-
market45 value characteristics is primarily based on the reduction of mar-
ket inefficiencies-time lags between the derivative price and its depen-
dence on the underlying asset price.46 Second, the reliability of a mar-
ket's pricing and risk management systems correlates with all aspects of
derivative trading. 47 Most importantly, transnational linkages between na-
tional capital markets and derivative traders affect the potential number
of resale derivative buyers and, thus, the liquidity of a market and its de-
rivatives products."
2. Derivatives Players
Major participants in the derivatives markets include financial in-
termediaries, their clients, and their traders. 49 Each participant has a
unique relationship with a derivatives market on which financial products
are bought and sold.50
Besides providing access to derivatives markets, financial in-
termediaries are the primary risk-transferring conduit in a derivatives
transaction." Financial institutions,5 2 especially U.S. banks, 53 comprise
43. See KPMG, supra note 13, at 102.
44. See, e.g., Isaac B. Lustgarten & Junling Ma, Risk Management Guidelines for
Derivatives-Part II, S&P's THE REVIEW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE, May 17,
1995, at 96 (commenting about the costs of cash flow mismatches in liquidity funding by
banking institutions).
45. The term represents the price adjustment in a derivative instrument (i.e. its posi-
tion) to reflect current market value, profits, or losses. See KPMG, supra note 13, at 95.
46. See generally THE GLOBECON GROUP, DERIVATIVES ENGINEERING: A GUIDE TO
STRUCrURING, PRICING, AND MARKETING DERIVATVES 56-62 (1995) [hereinafter GLOBECON
GROUP].
47. See id.
48. See McClintock, supra note 8, at 28-29.
49. See KPMG, supra note 13, at 38-39.
50. See id.
51. See GLOBECON GROUP, supra note 46, at 64-66 (discussing role of the intermedi-
ary in the transfer of risk among markets and between participants).
52. KPMG, supra note 13, at 38.
53. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS TAKEN
OR PROPOSED SINCE MAY 1994 tbl.l.1 (GAO/GGD/AIMD-97-8, Nov. 1, 1996), available
in LEXIS, Bankng Library, GAOFIN File (valuing 1995 derivatives activity of U.S. com-
mercial banks at $15.8 trillion). See also Shuman, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing com-
1997]
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the majority of these intermediaries. The financial gains from derivative
transactions, realized from transaction fees54 and market inefficiencies,55
encourage these firms' active involvement.
The scope of intermediaries' involvement with derivative products
extends from external market activities, such as dealing with clients, to
internal market activities, such as trading contracts on organized ex-
changes. Intermediaries' role in external market activities entails the
matching of clients', or end-users', financial objectives with appropriate
derivative products,56 either traded products 57 or custom-tailored con-
tracts.58 Intermediaries' involvement with internal market activities neces-
sitates the employment of "floor traders" who can instantly execute an
intermediary's buy and sell orders.59 Together, these participants and their
activities influence the supply and demand of derivative products.60
Clients seek derivative products to accomplish various financial
objectives. Derivatives, for example, can provide access to capital mar-
kets which, in turn, can reduce funding costs for investment budgeting.6'
Derivative products can also enhance the performance of portfolio man-
agers who can better configure a portfolio composition to specific invest-
ment needs. 62 Most commonly, the role of derivative products in a cli-
parative advantage of U.S. banks in derivative financial services); Anne Schwimmer,
Glass-Steagall Reform May Open Stormy Derivatives Debate; No "throwing the dice with
taxpayers' money," INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Mar. 6, 1995, at 9 (commenting about
the role of derivatives in banking regulatory reform proposals).
54. See Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance
or the Dance into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (1994).
55. See id. at 1037 (analyzing differences in the bidding and offering prices for fi-
nancial products and their impact on profitability).
56. See generally Joseph S. Rizzello, The Development and Evolution of Derivative
Products, in THE HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES AND SYNTHETICS: INNOVATIONS, TECHNOLO-
GIES, AND STRATEGIES IN THE GLOBAL MARKETS (Robert A. Klein & Jess Lederman eds.
1994).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. THE BANK OF ENGLAND, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF BANKING SUPERVISION IN-
QUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS 277 (1995) [hereinafter
BARINGS REPORT].
60. An example of this interaction can be observed in the growth of Derivative
Product Companies (DPCs). They are "stand alone", triple-A rated subsidiaries of finan-
cial services firms who establish them for the purpose of conducting derivative transac-
tions. See generally Paul Goris, Derivative Product Subsidiaries: The Counterparty's
View, 9 J. INT'L BANKING 345 (Sept. 1994).
61. See generally Singher, supra note 10, at 1406-08. See also McClintock, supra
note 8, at 27 (noting the impact of derivatives on transaction costs).
62. See Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 10, at 1016-17 nn.145-50 (comparing
the importance of diversification in modem portfolio theory with hedging strategies for
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ent's portfolio involves hedging against and speculating on types of
risks.63
In addition to market risk, derivative players face credit risk. This
risk represents the probability of default for contracting parties6 and its
subsequent impact on the need for replacement contracts.65 The value of
this risk is a function of the replacement costs at different times in the
life of a derivative contract. 6 Problems with estimating the value of this
risk, as well as its overall impact on a portfolio, may frustrate effective
risk-management solutions.67
The type of market and its regulation can greatly alter the amount of
credit risk in a derivative transaction. 61 Dealers may trade on markets that
can allocate this risk to one party, like the options market, where the
seller can shift all the risk onto the buyer.69 Exchange-traded and OTC
derivatives also affect the allocation of the risk. Exchange-traded deriva-
tives require that end-users can depend on the dealer and the exchange
market to ensure completed performance. 70 OTC derivatives and their
non-standardized nature require that end-users depend exclusively on the
dealer, or a contract's counterparty, for completed performance. 7' Deriva-
tive players will gravitate to those markets that can best minimize the
cost of such risks. 72
derivative products).
63. Id. See also Mason, supra note 12, at 162 (defining hedging, diversification, and
insurance strategies as the major uses for derivative products by end-users) (emphasis
added).
64. KPMG, supra note 13, at 101.
65. See, e.g., GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND
PRINCIPLES 45-47 (G30 eds., 1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP] (em-
phasizing the mutual concerns of OTC-contracts users who cannot rely on dealers or ex-
change markets for full performance).
66. The current replacement costs (i.e. the cost at the initial time (t=O)), is the pres-
ent value of the future cash payments that the non-defaulting party would have been enti-
tled to receive and will have to pay out to enter into a substitute contract. The future re-
placement costs (i.e. the cost at some future time (t=n)), depends on the volatility of the
underlying markets and its impact on the derivative's value. Id.
67. See Osborne, supra note 7, at 2 (outlining a new proposal to evaluate risks of
counterparties and avoid large losses, such as those incurred by Metallgesellschaft, Or-
ange County, Daiwa, and Barings).
68. See infra Part IV.A.
69. See GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 48 (describing how
the seller of an option contract can avoid credit risks, while the buyer of such a contract
cannot escape the risk of the seller's nonperformance).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The larger size of the OTC reflects this sentiment. Since most OTC market par-
ticipants have established reputations in their market segments and are well-known to
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Operational risks also expose all derivative players to the potential
economic consequences of management problems, technological limita-
tions, and trading breakdowns.73 Such risks can arise from human error,
that is, a trader may execute the wrong trade, credit or debit the wrong
account, or ignore a superior's orders.74 The management structure of a
financial institution that engages in derivative trading can alter this risk.
Corporate law 75 and securities law,76 especially in the U.S., provide in-
centives for management structures to comply with regulatory authorities
and to avoid potential liabilities from non-compliance. 77
In addition, domestic banking laws that affect derivative dealers and
end-users place an additional layer of safety against institutional misuse
of financial resources through increased penalties for non-compliance.
71
Such regulations influence the location of investment firms' derivative
trading offices, the financial products they offer, and the juridical form of
their domestic parent company and their foreign subsidiaries. 79
The role of lawyers in the development and execution of a deriva-
tive contract cannot be underestimated. The legal risk80 inherent in all de-
each other, the OTC market would appear to contain less credit risks than exchange-
traded markets. See infra notes 360-61 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., KPMG, supra note 13, at 102 (defining operational risks as the risk
that inadequate controls could be susceptible to fraudulent perpetrators, incorrect market
valuations, settlement and collection errors, and computer failures).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Limits of Self-Regulation, supra note 37 (discussing the growth of De-
rivative Product Companies (DPCs) and their role in minimizing products' risks in a self-
regulatory environment). One can also conjecture about an alternative impetus for the re-
cent interest in DPCs. Due to the regulatory and legal uncertainties with derivative prod-
ucts, financial firms probably want to limit and to isolate potential liabilities.
76. See infra Part IV.A.1.
77. See generally DERIVATIVES POLICY GROUP, FRAMEWORK FOR VOLUNTARY OVER-
sIGr (1995) (detailing derivatives sales practices, capital standards, and reporting require-
ments from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodities and
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and their implementation by six major Wall Street
firms).
78. See, e.g., Isaac B. Lustgarten & Junling Ma, Risk Management Guidelines for
Derivatives - Part 1, S&P's THE REVIEw OF BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICE, April 19,
1995, at 81. See also Banking: Commission Proposes Improvements to Supervisory Rules,
RAPID, May 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, RAPID File (discussing the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency's Handbook and its Banking Circular No. 277,
both of which distinguish between the role of banks as dealers and as end-users in the
derivatives market).
79. Cf Richard Lapper, Survey of Derivatives: Evolution in the Shadow of Disaster,
FIN. TIMS, Nov. 16, 1995, at 1 (describing how intemational efforts affected all aspects
of the transactional development of derivative products).
80. Legal risk is defined as "[t]he risk that a country's legal system will make par-
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rivative contracts is a cogp't's unpredictable reaction to the contract, espe-
cially when one of its terms violates the law."' This potential for voidness
creates incentives for traders and end-users to exercise diligence and ob-
tain legal advice. 2
Dealers also must comply with the regulatory agency that controls
the underlying asset in the derivative contract. 3 Such compliance in-
creases the transaction costs associated with transnational derivative trad-
ing.8 4 The uncertainties about the applicable choice of law provisions also
alter transaction costs and trading decisions.8 5
Competition in the international capital markets encourages dealers
to manipulate local regulatory agencies through servicing their clients
with a wider range of financial products.8 6 Financial intermediaries and
their traders have an incentive to trade on an exchange where the volume
of their transactions can have some impact on the overall valuation of the
derivative products.87 While the benefits of market dominance may be a
preferable risk-minimizing management technique, they will probably be
too costly to achieve.88
3. Basic Settlement Systems and Procedures for
Exchange-Traded Derivative Instruments
The standardized features of the futures and options contracts have
assisted in the expansion of exchange markets and their infrastructures.8 9
ticular derivative contracts unenforceable." KPMG, supra note 13, at 102.
81. See, e.g., Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham, L.B.C., 2 W.L.R. 372, 373 (1991)
(making the council of the London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham and its commit-
ments on £3 billion of various swap contracts unenforceable and finding such derivative
products to be ultra vires transactions, outside the permissible commercial activities of a
local council).
82. See Mark Osa Igiehon, Barings' Collapse: The Legal Nature of Derivatives Re-
visited, 16 COMPANY LAWYER 311-13 (1995).
83. See infra Part IV.A.
84. SARKIS J. KHOURY, THE DEREGULATION OF WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS 54
(1990) (implying that there is a direct relationship between government regulations and
transaction costs).
85. Id.
86. See James Kynge, Derivatives: Ingenious New Ideas for Futures, FIN. TIMES,
May 9, 1997, at 2 (explaining how regional competition in Asian futures markets affects
Singapore's development of new derivatives).
87. See McClintock, supra note 8, at 28-29.
88. See generally GLOBECON GROUP, supra note 46, at 13 (showing the financing
and risk-management solutions that can be achieved with different variations of derivative
products).
89. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: Ac-
TIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1994).
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Even though these market exchanges specialize in particular derivative
products, 90 they employ specific rules and procedures that govern the
transactions of their members. Such guidelines preserve the integrity and
soundness of the exchanges and their financial products.91
Derivative players have access to these exchanges through their
clearinghouses, which act as a counterparty to every derivative contract.
92
Specific clearinghouse requirements, especially margin requirements, 93 af-
fect these players and their transactions. For example, the Singapore In-
ternational Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) imposes transactional limita-
tions on its members based on client-generated trading activity and
proprietary-generated trading activity.94 These rules, as well as formal
regulations, have a tremendous impact on the development of financial
90. Each exchange is structured around a particular type of financial derivative prod-
uct. For example, the London Metal Exchange deals exclusively with futures on copper,
lead, tin, aluminum, nickel and zinc. See KPMG, supra note 13, at 36.
91. See Philip Coggan, Survey of Singapore, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 1996, at 5 (discuss-
ing the ability of SIMEX to function during the Barings crisis).
92. See Karol, supra note 10, at 198-99.
93. A feature of all futures and exchange traded option contracts is the margin re-
quirements that must be posted with the clearinghouse. Initial margin deals with the daily
monetary reserves that an exchange's clearinghouse requires until the contracts position is
terminated, or in trade parlance, "closed-out." See KPMG, supra note 13, at 95. Mainte-
nance margin represents the permitted variation from initial margin deposits to some pre-
determined level before the contract holder will be required to restore the account to its
initial margin levels. Id. Variation margin, which represents the variation in the mark-to-
market value of a financial futures contract, requires a trader to cover downward price
movements on daily prices. Id. The process of charging futures users for their losses or
crediting them for their gains at the end of each trading day is known as the daily settle-
ment. Id.
94. SIMEX requires clearing members to differentiate between "house" and "cli-
ent" accounts. BARINGS REPORT, supra note 59, T 3.13. "House" accounts represent mar-
gin requirements for the clearing member's own trading accounts. Id. "Client" accounts
represent the margin requirements for the clearing member's clients. Id. The Tokyo Inter-
national Financial Futures Exchange (TIFFE) utilizes similar margin requirements. Id.
The method of crediting and debiting these clearinghouse margin accounts is a func-
tion of the accounting scheme, that is, whether there exists commingling between
"house" and "client" margin accounts. Id. 3.15. For example, SIMEX uses the Stan-
dard Portfolio Analysis of Risk (SPAN) margining system that determines initial margin
calls on the aggregate portfolio risk position of an account. Id. I 3.12.
More importantly, the concept of "netting" and "non-netting" contributes to the
ability of traders to artificially inflate the liquidity of the derivative market through
manipulating margin requirements. Id. 3.13. Netting permits clearing house members to
use their gains to offset any losses in their accounts. Id. Such procedures affect the clear-
ing member's transactional activity and its profitability because they ultimately determine
the actual amount of capital that is required to trade and cover positions in futures mar-
kets. See infra Part IV.B.
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products and their associated risks.95
In addition, the role of technology in minimizing variations in ac-
counting measures between financial intermediaries and listed-exchanges
affects the volume of derivative products that are traded.96 Accounting
measures encompass time variations between the commencement and ex-
ecution of a trade.97 The computer programs through which these prod-
ucts are traded have assumed increasing significance as banks, in particu-
lar, are accelerating their international payments systems by using the
Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS). 98 This significance comes
from the role of netting arrangements and margin requirements for trad-
ing on designated markets. 99
Competition for the trading business and fiscal revenues, speed of
technological changes in exchange infrastructure and product innovation,
and variation in management control between national parent corpora-
tions and foreign subsidiaries, all have a strong impact on derivative-
related risks through creating arbitrage opportunities and enticing
"rogue" traders.100 Settlement systems and the national jurisdictions that
govern them reflect an attempt to minimize such derivative-related
risks.'0' Such systems greatly modify the inherent risks of highly com-
plex derivative products. 102
95. See Karol, supra note 10, at 198 (describing how each contract holder bears
the credit risk of the exchange's clearinghouse).
96. See BARINGS REPORT, supra note 59, 3.10 (contrasting trading methods be-
tween the electronic systems of Japanese exchanges with the open-outcry pits of SIMEX).
97. See Andre F. Perold, The Payment System and Derivative Instruments, in THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 33, 33 (Harvard Business
School, Global Financial System Project, ed. 1995) (discussing Herstatt Risk that occurs
where there exists an asymmetric payment and delivery procedure because of different
operating hours of fund transfer systems in different countries without remedial banking
arrangements).
98. See Banking: More Banks Seek to Speed Up International Payments, BIS Says,
BNA Bus. & FIN. DAILY, April 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, Itrade Library, BNAIBF
File (commenting on new, faster payments systems, such as RTGS, which are being used
to facilitate international transactions). See also TCAM Targets Securities Lending and
Repo, FIN. TECH. BULLETIN, Oct. 26, 1995, at 4 (citing recent increases in derivative trad-
ing as impetus for TCAM Systems to launch new global securities support package).
99. Id.
100. See infra Part II1.B.
101. See infra Parts 1.B, IV.B, VI.A.
102. See infra Part III.B.
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III. THE BARINGS CRISIS: MARKET AND MANAGERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
AND THEIR IMPACT ON UNAUTHORIZED TRADING AcTIvrrY
The complexity of derivative instruments, their ability to contribute
to a firm's capital structure, and their potential to create massive losses
can be observed in the collapse of Barings Plc. Management infrastruc-
ture, as well as the derivative products and their markets, greatly contrib-
uted to this collapse. While these qualities may be unique to the Barings
situation, they can probably occur, or already exist, at any major finan-
cial institution. 103
A. Barings and Its "Old-Boys" Management Style
The majority of commentary about the Barings Collapse, along with
its ambiguities, focuses on the bank's inadequate management structures
and reporting requirements between investment banking operations within
the Barings Group, which was composed of Barings Plc and its subsidi-
aries. 14 These inadequacies, in the author's opinion, are an inherent qual-
ity of any bureaucracy as venerable as Barings, whose well-established
banking presence in London protected its domestic and international fi-
nancial operations from typical regulatory scrutiny.05 The so-called man-
agement of the Barings operations can be euphemistically categorized as
unconventional and unorthodox.1° Moreover, this management infrastruc-
ture passively, or perhaps actively, encouraged the unauthorized trading
activities of Nick Leeson, the crisis's central figure, who aggressively
contributed to the firm's expansion into Asian securities markets. 07 His
103. See, e.g., George Graham, Banking Regulator Highlights Failings, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1996, at 8 (describing the bond trading losses of Japan's Daiwa Bank from its
New York trading operations).
104. See, e.g., Comment, Barings Once More, 16 COMPANY LAwYER 290 (1995)
(contrasting official reports from England's Board of Banking Supervision with Singa-
pore's Companies Act Inspectors on the role of management in unauthorized trading
positions).
105. The Baring Brothers financial house dominated British financial history, from
financing early Anglo-Saxon wars through maintaining relations with exclusive clients.
See RON CHERNOW. THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF
MODERN FINANCE 3-16 (1990). In 1890, the Bank of England even organized international
financial interests to create a reserve fund that saved Barings from bankruptcy. Id. at 71.
106. Management structure for the Barings Investment Bank was so non-existent
that Barings' management did not have any organizational chart or schemata until after
the .collapse, at which time a chart was then created, but only to assist regulators in their
investigation. See BARINGS REPORT, supra note 59, 3.10. As a result, most managers did
not have any clear responsibilities for specific activities and lacked control over trading
activities. See id.
107. See infra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
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trading activities also facilitated the proposed consolidation of Barings'
banking and financial service operations.'0
Before the 1984 acquisition of Henderson Crosthwaite's stock broker
business,' 9 Baring Brothers & Co. (BB & Co.) was primarily engaged in
corporate finance and debt trading. 10 This acquisition triggered an impor-
tant modification in Barings Group's" corporate structure." 2 For exam-
ple, the creation of Barings Securities Limited (BSL) was needed to sub-
sume Crostwaite's equity securities business and to exploit Crostwaite's
Asian market connections." 3 BSL established a strong presence in the
Japanese markets, especially the Japanese warrant market.' 14 Even though
such activity was profitable, it encouraged overdevelopment and eventu-
ally caused BSL to consolidate with BB & Co. for bank reporting
purposes." 5
The formation of Barings Investment Bank in 1993 further modified
the Barings management structure and contributed to Barings' ultimate
collapse." 6 The focus on profit and expansion in Asian securities markets
precluded the development of workable management hierarchy and the
allocation of clearly defined managerial responsibilities.' ' 7
108. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
109. Henderson Crosthwaite was a UK-based stockbroker, headed by Mr. Christo-
pher Heath, who eventually assimilated into the Barings Group management structure.
See BARINGS REPORT, supra note 59, T 2.4.
110. See id.
111. This term refers to the corporate structures that were closely involved with the
collapse. Barings, plc (UK incorporated), the main holding company, that controlled Bar-
ing Brothers & Co. (BB & Co.) (UK incorporated and authorized by the Bank of En-
gland with its UK operations authorized by the Securities and Futures Authority). See id.
app. XIV.2. BB & Co. controlled Barings Securities Ltd. (Cayman Islands incorporated
with its head office in UK) which, in turn, controlled Barings Securities Ltd. (London)
(UK incorporated), Barings Futures Pte, Ltd. (Singapore) (Singapore incorporated), and
Baring Securities Ltd. (Japan) (Cayman Islands incorporated). Id. As this overly simpli-
fied list of companies suggests, the Barings Group, comprised of over 100 companies,
posed many challenges to regulators, inspectors, and commentators.
112. See id. T 2.5.
113. See id. The Barings Group made Mr. Heath the chairman of Barings Securities
Ltd. (BSL). Id. 2.4.
114. See id. f 2.8.
115. See id. (describing how the BSL growth exhausted regulatory capital alloca-
tions for securities operations and required short-term bank borrowing).
116. See id. T 2.20. See also id. 2.22 (discussing replacement of top management
structure at BSL and the development of a new matrix reporting structure in which
"profit responsibility was on a product basis but with local office management having an
important role in holding together the office infrastructure (systems, controls, accounting,
settlements, and administration)").
117. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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In April 1992, BB & Co. hired a new director, Mr. Ron Baker,
whose former position at Bankers Trust made him attractive to Barings'
"old-boys club" hierarchy." 8 His arrival also prompted a reallocation of
the proprietary equity derivatives business under his guidance." 9 In hind-
sight, this placement was most unfortunate. 20 As Mr. Baker's comments
indicated, he was much too lax in his responsibilities. 2' The Bank of En-
gland noted that Baker's managerial designation made him ultimately re-
sponsible for the profitability of the equity derivatives business. 22
Another example where the management ignored sound business
judgment was its lack of concern over the expressed skepticism about the
arrival of Nick Leeson at Barings Futures (Singapore). As Peter Bax,
head of the Singapore Office and eventual regional managing director,
articulated,
My concern is that once again we are in danger of setting up a
structure which will subsequently prove disastrous and with
which we will succeed in losing either a lot of money or client
goodwill or probably both. . . . In my view it is critical that we
should keep clear reporting lines and if this office is involved in
SIMEX at all then Nick [Leeson] should report to Simon [Jones]
and then be ultimately responsible for the operations side. 23
118. See id. '12.42.
119. Three reasons motivated Barings' management decision. Firstly, derivatives did
not fit within the culture of securities business and needed to prevent client overlap. Sec-
ondly, the Debt Financial Products Group had experience using proprietary derivatives
from asset swap activity, which tended to be in OTC derivatives rather than in exchange
traded derivatives. Thirdly, Barings perceived Ron Baker as a good motivator of proprie-
tary derivative traders. See id. 1 2.44
120. Ron Baker's relation to Leeson enabled the unauthorized trades to continue. As
Baker himself stated, "There is not doubt in my mind, that my lack of experience in the
area was a contributing factor to what has happened here [the collapse]." See id. l 2.47.
121. Baker's response to the Bank of England's inquiry will certainly advance this
position: "It may well be that I bite off more than I can chew in taking the job that was
proposed to me. Perhaps, I was far too cavalier about the way in which it was defined. I
was willing to let other people define this thing. I would just take it on and fit .... " See
id. 2.45.
122. See id. 2.48 (describing Baker's explanations about the profitability of the eq-
uity derivatives business without illustrating a sound understanding of the business or the
facts).
123. See id. qI 2.59. Simon Jones was the local chief operating officer to whom
Leeson was supposed to report. See id. ql 2.36. Jones did not consider himself "operation-
ally responsible" for Leeson's day-to-day futures operations. See id. l 2.54.
The matrix management system, whereby profit responsibility was allocated by prod-
uct basis with more liberal participation by local office management on their internal or-
ganization, further exacerbated Barings Singapore operation's mismanagement. See id.
[Vol. 21
BARINGS BAR NONE
This memorandum, even with its first-name references to parties, indi-
cated that Barings' management was not completely ignorant of the po-
tential risks associated with this disorganized corporate structure and
trading activity. 2 4 The operations of Barings Securities (Japan) also dem-
onstrates the absence of successful risk control functions. 125
The evolution of Nick Leeson's involvement within the Barings
Group further illustrates the dynamics of Barings' "old-boys club" man-
agement style that defied conventional management techniques. 26 As the
central figure in the Barings debacle, Leeson's personal history will also
reveal the origin of his aggressive trading positions.
Leeson joined BB & Co. in 1989 to work on futures and options
settlements, a continuation of his previous role at Morgan Stanley
(London) from 1987 to 1989.127 On May 1, 1991, he became a part of
the Business Development Group in London, in charge of special
projects and investigations within BB & Co. 28 He was involved with an
investigation at Barings Securities Ltd. into the suppression of a late mar-
gin report arising from apparent collusion between an employee and a
client with an overdrawn account. 129 This familiarity with Barings report-
ing procedures must have proved very beneficial to Leeson's own trading
activity with the Singapore office. 130
(H 2.22 & 2.39.
The fact that one individual (Leeson) was permitted to have first line responsi-
bility for both trading and settlements meant that a crucial ingredient in the ma-
trix organization of local integrity was absent in BFS. Therefore, management
control was ineffective, in that management believed and relied upon the risk
and performance information generated by transactions processed in BFS, ap-
parently without independent investigation ....
See id. q 2.40.
124. The "old-boy club" style of management, whereby political considerations out-
weigh technical expertise, is even present in other areas corporate control. The new head
of Group Treasury and Risk, who was appointed in August 1994, claimed concern over
the low level of experience among the staff in Barings' treasury and risk functions. Such
inexperience contributed to the staff's inability to successfully execute a project about
monitoring risk on a global basis, especially the role of margin calls on positions to set
appropriate gross limits for the business. See id. 91 2.69.
125. See, e.g., id. 2.73 (describing how the risk control functions for Barings Japa-
nese operations was rendered ineffective by its reliance on information that was supplied
by Barings Singapore operations).
126. See generally, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS,
AICPA AUDIT AND ACCOUNTING MANUAL (June 1, 1983) (discussing conventional man-
agement techniques).
127. See BARINGS REPORT, supra note 59, q1 2.56.
128. See id. 9[ 2.57.
129. Id.
130. In theory, Barings may have inadvertently commenced its own demise through
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Barings' management was acquainted with Leeson's problematic
character. In February 1992, Barings submitted an application to Securi-
ties and Futures Authority in London to enable Leeson to become a reg-
istered representative. 131 The Authority expressed hesitation to grant such
registration because of "an undisclosed outstanding County Court Judg-
ment against" Leeson. 132 The application was withdrawn due to Leeson's
desire to secure employment in the Singapore office. 133
At the end of 1992, Leeson took the SIMEX examinations which
enabled him to wear a badge on the exchange floor and, upon passing,
was able to trade on the floor of the exchange. 3 4 Subsequently, in early
1993, the London Office, believing the Singapore Office would supervise
Leeson, appointed him General Manager of Baring Futures (Singapore)
(BFS). 35 Thereafter, he became intertwined with the break-down of the
management office structure and blamed for the demise of the Barings
Group.
B. The Role of Derivative Trading in the Expansion and the Collapse
of the Barings Group's Structure
Baring Futures (Singapore), where Nick Leeson conducted his unau-
thorized trading activity, had significantly contributed to Barings' overall
profitability in the years prior to its collapse. 13 6 The expansion of Bar-
ings' overseas trading activities increased its available capital funding. 137
giving Leeson an inside knowledge of how to conduct unauthorized trades outside the
control of management supervision.
131. See BARINGS REPORT, supra note 59, 2.57.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. 2.60.
135. Id.
136. Id. 3.54. For 1994, Leeson's trading activity has been estimated to represent
£28.5 million of £52.9 million revenue for the Structured Product Group. Id. Moreover,
Barings remunerated Mr. Leeson's trading activities with numerous bonuses based on his
trading performance. Id. I1 2.81-.85. For 1992 and 1993, Leeson received £35,746 and
£130,000 respectively. Id. 9 2.92. His 1994 bonus before he resigned was estimated as
£450,000. Id.
Moreover, these inflated bonuses helped to reduce "reported profit before tax" by
£100,103,000 in 1993 and £102,381,000 in 1994. Id. at 141 fig. 8.1. These substantial
savings demonstrate, although indirectly, the effect of derivatives on the Barings Group
balance sheet. The volume of Barings' futures transactions also enabled the firm to ex-
ploit both positive and negative market trends which allowed Barings and its shareholders
to benefit from overvaluation of the firm's available funds. Id. (illustrating the difference
between shareholders' funds without reported derivatives losses and adjusted sharehold-
ers' funds with derivatives losses).
137. Id. 2.8 (describing the consolidation of Barings Group activities to avoid reg-
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In addition, the capital funding costs for expanding the Barings Group
were more than offset by Leeson-generated derivatives profits. 3 '
Barings' equity derivative trading activity encompassed both the
Over-the-Counter (OTC) proprietary'3 9 derivatives trading activity in
London,1 4 and the exchange trading proprietary business in Tokyo and
Hong Kong.' 4' The proprietary traders of the Tokyo volatility book 42
generated a majority of this revenue. 143 Leeson enhanced these traders'
performance through his "switching activities."' 144 The "switching" activ-
ulatory limitations and meet margin requirements). See also id. J[ 6.65 (noting that manip-
ulation in clients' margin accounts artificially inflated the Barings Securities Ltd. bank ac-
count that financed its futures trading).
138. See id. 3.63 (citing comments from a Barings Group financial officer about
the January 1995 profits). "Wow! that is impressive . . . .You know if he [Leeson]
makes US$10 million doing arbitrage in a week, what is that? About US$1/2 billion a
year. That is pretty good doing arbitrage. That guy is a turbo arbitrageur!" Id.
Besides the inflated profits, the Barings Group received other benefits. From 1992-
94, proprietary trading activities were recorded between the London and Japanese Securi-
ties businesses to exploit tax, regulatory, or margining benefits. Id. 5.10.
139. Proprietary trading is a generic term that refers to a financial institution's risk
positions in a market and its corresponding accounts as separate from client business. Id.
2.17.
140. This OTC activity was mostly in debt rather than in equity derivatives and was
conducted for proprietary purposes. Id. 91 2.44. Exchange-traded derivatives in London
were based on the firm's LIFFE membership for trading interest rate futures and hedging
their positions. Id.
141. Exchange-traded activities included equity index arbitrage in Tokyo and Hong
Kong, comprised mainly of "Osaka Exchange traded equity index options and writing
OTC equity swaps and options for clients." Id. 91 2.46. The Barings division responsible
for these trades was the Equity Financial Group, located within Japan, that covered trans-
actions "booked" in Japan and London, but managed in Singapore. Id. T 2.47. "Booked"
refers to an execution of a trader's buy and sell order. Id.
142. Id. ]l 3.25-.27(describing how the activity started in 1993 and its profitability
from price differences in Nikkei 225 contracts). "Volatility" trading represents the ex-
ploitation of mispriced options. Id. T 4.59.
143. Sixty-five percent of revenue originated from "switching activity." Id.
"Switching" was a specialized form of inter-exchange arbitrage over which Leeson had
responsibility for intra-day risk limits that were set by Barings' Asset and Liability Com-
mittee. Id. $ 3.26. As in arbitrage, Leeson exploited price differentials through simultane-
ous purchases of the same futures contracts on different futures exchanges. Id. 91 3.27.
This primarily involved Nikkei 225 contracts between the Osaka and Singapore ex-
changes in Tokyo traders' proprietary volatility book, conducted on behalf of Baring Se-
curities (Japan) (BSJ) by Baring Futures (Singapore) (BFS). Id. Management referred to
the "switching" book as "Leeson's business." Id. 91 2.43.
144. Leeson was considered the best person to take responsibility because of his po-
sition on the trading floor and his access to trade information. Id. 91 3.26. Ultimately, this
"switching" activity greatly improved the quality of the futures hedging positions initi-
ated by BSJ traders. See id. 91 3.27.
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ity that Leeson conducted involved inter-exchange arbitrage to improve
the futures hedging positions of Barings' Japanese traders. 145
Leeson commenced switching activities in 1993 with his unautho-
rized trading activities through three major futures contracts traded on six
exchange markets: 1) the Nikkei 225 contract which he traded on the
SIMEX in Singapore and the Osaka Security Exchange (OSE) in Japan;
2) the ten-year Japanese government bond contract also traded on the
SIMEX in Singapore and the Tokyo Stock Exchange in Japan; and 3) the
three-month Euroyen contract, traded on the SIMEX and the TIFFE in
Japan.1'4 In addition, Leeson wrote options on these underlying contracts
to evade internal auditors and government regulators. 47 These options en-
abled Leeson to allocate the costs of his wagering activity to Barings cli-
ents as well as to other Barings' Divisions, such that he could continue
to conceal his trading losses.'4
Variations in the trading systems enabled Leeson to perceive arbi-
trage opportunities and to exploit their profitability' 49 as well as to em-
ploy creative financing schemes 50 and evade regulatory agencies.'15 Sig-
nificant differences between SIMEX, OSE, and TSE included the
infrastructure of the settlement systems, the margin requirements for trad-
ing members, and the calculation of risk for such requirements.'52
Members of SIMEX trade contracts in "open-outcry" pits, which is
an auction-based system that accelerates the rate of price movements and
closings. 53 The Japanese exchanges, on the other hand, use electronic
data input systems that minimize the lag from computer data entry by
clerks and system updates, and decelerate the rate of closing contract
145. Id. J[ 3.27. "Switching" refer to Barings' specialized arbitrage activity that
"involved the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same futures contracts on different
futures exchanges." Id. at 281.
146. Id. 93.7.
147. See id. T[ 4.65-.67 (describing Leeson's straddle strategy through which he sold
call and put options with the same strike price and profited from the straddle's premium).
"Put options are contracts sold for a price (the premium) that gives the holder the right,
but not the obligation, to sell to the writer of the contract [Leeson], over a pre-defined
time period, a specified quantity of futures contracts at a specified price (the strike
price)." Id. at 279. Call options represent similar contracts, except the holder has the
right, but not the obligation, to buy from the option writer. Id.
148. Id. M 5.44-.45 (noting the contribution of options to Leeson's ability to manip-
ulate journal entries in the trading books for Barings Singapore operatiods).
149. Id. 91 3.8 (detailing valuation differences for the same contract between the OSE
and SIMEX).
150. See infra notes 170-84 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
152. See BARINGS REPORT, supra note 59, H 3.9-3.12.
153. See id. T1 3.10.
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prices. 154 The slightest variation in time creates a small arbitrage opportu-
nity, that is, a disequilibrium in prices between the two exchanges that
can be exploited for significant profit only with a large volume transac-
tion.'55 Thus, the structural inefficiencies of the exchange trading systems
created the incentive for Leeson to take a high volume of futures posi-
tions and to exploit this profit opportunity.
The exchange systems also employ trading curbs on futures con-
tracts which further exacerbate this price disequilibria1 56 The OSE and
TSE both limit the daily overall price movements in futures contracts
before trading becomes interrupted. 157 SIMEX, however, does not use a
daily limit to monitor price movements. 58 Rather, SIMEX requires an
obligatory fifteen-minute pause in trading when there exists a five-
percent and ten-percent price move in Nikkei 225 contracts. 159 These dis-
tortions in market forces enabled traders, like Leeson, to have further in-
centives to exploit price disequilibria between these exchanges.
Most importantly, the ability for Leeson to finance his unauthorized
trading activity came from variations in margin requirements. 60 The
amount of margin required for SIMEX was calculated on the Standard
Portfolio Analysis of Risk (SPAN) margining system that calculates ini-
tial margin requirements based on the aggregate portfolio risk position of
a SIMEX member's account and on the anticipated adverse price move-
ments generated by a statistical model.' 6' SIMEX also requires members
to maintain separate margin accounts for "client" and "house" positions
which are margined on a gross basis. 62 Gross basis requires the value of
contracts at time of purchase without deducting for long and short posi-
tions for the same contract. 63
These characteristics offer traders, like Leeson, more opportunity to
manipulate account positions and their respective margin requirements
because the absence of netting removes the incentive for hedging "cli-
154. Id.
155. Id. ' 3.27. See, e.g., J. ORLIN GRABBE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 82
(1986) (analyzing the presence of commercial banks in exploiting arbitrage opportunities
for interbank swaps).
156. See BARINGS REPORT, supra note 59 9[ 3.11.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. J[ 3.12. See also id. (1 5.42 (discussing manipulation of trading positions for
house and client accounts for evading margining requirements).
161. Id. 13.12.
162. Id. (H 3.13.
163. Id.
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ent" and "house" positions.'l Perhaps, as illustrated by Leeson's trading
activity, gross basis adjustment enhances speculative trading, that is,
more traders need to maximize overall cash-flow for their trading posi-
tions to preserve such positions and to minimize margin requirements.
61
Unlike SIMEX, the Japanese use a different method to calculate ini-
tial margin requirements. Initial margins for Japanese exchanges are de-
termined by fixed percentages of each contract's value.' 66 This calculation
makes the margin requirement much more sensitive to market trends. 167
Within this schemata, Leeson exercised his authority to conduct Bar-
ings "switching" business between SIMEX, the Osaka Securities Ex-
change (OSE) for Nikkei 225, the Tokyo Securities Exchange (TSE) for
Japanese government bonds, and the TIFFE for Euroyen contracts. 168 The
Barings Group's management, along with the Bank of England, has cate-
gorized the majority of Leeson's transactions as unauthorized, that is, he
acted completely beyond the scope of his superior officers for approxi-
mately three years. 169
. A transaction, known in trade parlance as a "cross trade," enabled
Leeson to make unauthorized price adjustments in his switching activi-
ties.170 Usually, an exchange member uses a cross trade to match, buy and
sell orders for the same contract at the same price for two different cus-
tomer accounts.' 7' Leeson conducted many such trades on the SIMEX ex-
change 172 between account 88888 and account 92000 (containing arbi-
trage positions for the Japanese -Securities operations in Nikkei and
Japanese Government bond contracts), account 98007 (containing arbi-
164. Id. (describing TIFFE "net basis" margin policy that allows long and short po-
sitions for the same contract within different "house" accounts to offset each other).
165. See, e.g., id. ( 3.15. See also id. M[ 14.26-.27 (noting how Leeson's involve-
ment with numerous exchanges and their policy frustrated Barings risk management pol-
icy). Risk management refers to the level of credit exposure that a financial firm can ef-
fectively manage without jeopardizing its overall operations. See, e.g., id. '1 14.21.
Commingling house and client monies for margin payments undermined such risk man-
agement policy because incorrect accounting entries exacerbated miscalculations. Id.
14.22.
166. Id. 3.12.
167. Id.
168. Id. 5.9.
169. Id. 4.50. It astonishes this commentator how a single trader in the Barings
Singapore operations, from 1992 to 1995, could create a billion dollar loss when he, as
well as the Singapore operations, were only authorized to conduct transactions for cus-
tomers or other Barings companies. Id.
170. Id. H 5.14.
171. This transaction permits two floor traders from the same firm to transfer posi-
tions through an exchange for two accounts of a exchange member. Id.
172. Id.
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trage positions for the London Securities operations in Japanese Govern-
ment bond contracts), and account 98008 (containing arbitrage positions
for the London Securities operations in Euroyen contracts)., 73 The ful-
crum of Leeson's activity was account 88888,17 which enabled him to
manipulate his trading positions 7 5 and to shield his losses from
detection. 176
Tracing these account's trading positions and profits, one can
quickly discern that Leeson was more of a punter than a financial strate-
gist. 177 Starting on January 1, 1995, Leeson was filling this account with
long Nikkei 225 contracts; in other words, he was betting that the index
would increase over the long-run. 78 Unfortunately, he was very long and
very wrong. 79 The more long positions he maintained to cover his pre-
ceding losses, the further downward the index sunk. 80
On February 23, 1995, account 88888 had a position in long futures
that covered 49% of "open" interest in March 1995 contracts and 24%
in June 1995 contracts.' 8' This sheer volume, compounded by the lack of
sound financial analysis, produced the inevitable disaster. Barings could
not meet its Yen variation margin for the 23rd of February, nor its in-
creased initial margin, when the Nikkei opened 880 points down on the
27th of February. 8 2 SIMEX assumed these positions and sent Barings
Futures Singapore, Ltd., into receivership. 8 3
173. Id. [ 5.15.
174. Since July 8, 1992, Leeson was using this account for unauthorized purposes.
See id. (# 5.3 (quoting a systems consultant in the Singapore office, Dr. Edmund Wong,
who received instructions from Leeson to modify software to exclude that account from
all major file reports, except the Margin File report).
175. Account 88888 constituted an essential element of Leeson's trading activity: "It
appears that after the conclusion of the trade, Leeson would instruct the settlements staff
to break down the total number of contracts into several different trades, and to change
the trade prices thereon to cause profits to be credited to 'switching' accounts referred to
above and losses to be charged to account 88888." Id. T 5.17.
176. Id. 4.15 (describing how the account was used to book adjustments and facti-
tious transactions that meant to conceal daily account balances from SIMEX and Barings,
as well as the account's monthly ending equity balance).
177. See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, Big Gambles, Lost Bets Sunk a Venerable
Firm, N.Y. TimS, Mar. 3, 1995, at Al, D15.
178. See BARINGS REPORT, supra note 59, J 4.18.
179. See id. IM 4.20-.23 (describing impact of Kobe earthquake on Nikkei 225 con-
tracts and Leeson's wrongly anticipated market recovery or desire to capture the market,
as well as the presence of increased volatility and its impact on amplifying market
movements).
180. Id. f 4.24.
181. Id. 4.25.
182. Id. 4.27.
183. Id.
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The financing of Leeson's trading activity from 1992 through 1995
also increases the mystery why neither financial regulators 8 4 nor Barings'
management8 5 discovered these "unauthorized" trades. Leeson's financ-
ing strategy affected the entire Barings Group structure and caused the
Group's collapse. His funding originated from third-party clients of Bar-
ings Securities London and Japanese operations, as well as from Banque
National de Paris, the Singapore operation's sole client.1 6 The funding
from other Barings companies also contributed to this financial
interdependence. 8 7
Unlike the Bank of England which blamed one individual for the
Barings collapse, 88 this author believes that the intended and unintended
managerial problems at Barings, 189 as well as the variations in exchange
systems and the activities from Leeson's homo luden nature, produced
the devastating margin call of £827 million. This signalled an abrupt halt
in the existence of Baring's banking and financial services. 90
The Barings Collapse shocked the international financial community.
As a result, the international financial community quickly responded with
numerous voluntary arrangements between trading exchanges and their
systems.' 91 Moreover, the Barings Collapse has energized and altered the
184. Barings' activities evaded numerous regulators including the Bank of England
(the lead regulator of the Barings Group), the Securities and Futures Authority (the regu-
lator of Barings Securities Ltd and Barings Securities (London) Ltd), the SIMEX (the
regulator of Barings Securities (Singapore) Ltd), and Japanese Ministry of Finance (the
regulator of Barings Securities (Japan) Ltd). See id. 111.1.
The Bank of England partially blames its laxity on the consolidation of Barings' op-
erations and its computer systems' inability to monitor the margin accounts of Barings'
clients on an individual basis. See id. W1[ 11.21-.31. The Bank also acknowledged its igno-
rance about Barings Securities operations and its jurisdictional uncertainties about the
firm's overseas transactions. Id. 11.22.
185. Cf. id. IM1 6.22-.35 (describing Barings Investment Bank's ineffective supervi-
sion and overall ignorance about the funding for the Singapore trading operations).
186. Id. 91 6.6.
187. Id. (noting how other Barings companies borrowed funds from outside banks or
each other to finance Leeson's SIMEX positions). See also id. 1 6.20, I1 6.62-.80 (illus-
trating cumulative funding on company-by-company contribution from 1994 through
1995).
188. See id. 1 14.1.
189. See, e.g., Barings Once More, supra note 104 (citing the skepticism in the Sin-
gapore Inspector's report about the ignorance of Barings management to Leeson's activ-
ity, due to the firm's ability to uncover account 88888 within hours of Leeson's
departure).
190. See id.
191. The Windsor Declaration represented a voluntary arrangement between leaders
of regulatory bodies from the United States, Great Britain, and fourteen other countries to
increase global supervision of large market positions and enhance cooperation between
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debate about the role of derivatives in the banking industry and the at-
tendant regulatory modifications therein. 192
IV. SOME LESSONS FROM CURRENT DERIVATIVE REGULATORY REGIMES
AND THEIR ROLE IN FUTURE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
The complexity of derivative products necessitates a broad spectra
of regulatory guidelines. There exists' both governmental regulations,
originating in securities, 193 commodities, 194 and banking laws 195 as well as
private self-regulating rules, announced by the International Swaps and
Derivative Association (ISDA),196 the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB), 197 and voluntary cooperation agreements between trading
markets.98
In light of the Barings Crisis, three major regulatory areas warrant
further analysis. Firstly, the evolution of existing regulation and the his-
tory of proposed regulation can demonstrate the major players in this fi-
nancial product and their impact on national and international govern-
ments.' 99 Secondly, the procedural operation of derivative instruments and
corresponding regulations can illustrate that exchange markets, especially
their operation and margin requirements for traded products, should be
market regulators and authorities. Derivative Rules Proposed, INv. Bus. DAILY, May 18,
1995, at B1 (quoting remarks from the chairman of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission that the declaration should decrease the market crisis caused by the single
failure of a single participant, i.e. the Barings Collapse).
192. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 103.
193. See, e.g., Marc A. Horwitz, Swaps Ahoy! Should Regulators Voyage Into Un-
known Waters, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 515, 526 (1994) (describing the relation-
ship among derivatives, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
194. See, e.g., PHILIP M. JOHNSON & THOMAS L. HAZEN, COMMODmES REGULATION
§ 1.31 (2d ed., 1989) (discussing the supervisory role of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission in exchange markets).
195. See, e.g., Charles E. Dropkin et al., United States, in The Regulations Gov-
erning Derivatives: An International Guide, 1992 Int'l Fin. L. Rev. 38, 51-53 (Jan. 1992
Special Supp.) (describing the regulatory paradigm of the Federal Reserve Board and the
Office of Comptroller of the Currency in U.S. banks' derivative activities).
196. See, e.g., Aaron Pressman, Firms Urged to Fully Disclose Derivatives Use,
REUTERS, BC CYCLE, Mar. 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File (il-
lustrating the function of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association to improve
the soundness of derivative products).
197. See, e.g., KPMG, supra note 13, at 41-46 (describing how FASB provides cri-
teria for hedging and speculating positions in derivative transactions).
198. See, e.g., Derivative Rules Proposed, supra note 191 (describing Windsor Dec-
laration's attempt to improve cooperation and communication among market regulators).
199. See infra notes 202-52 and accompanying text.
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the focus of regulatory reform.2°° Finally, the role of government in pro-
viding incentives for derivative-users to harmonize their trading practices,
especially banks' derivative activities, can provide the most robust policy
for international regulatory reform.2
0 1
A. A Brief Review of the U.S. Derivative Regulatory Regime
Government agencies have traditionally delineated their regulatory
responsibilities based on public policy considerations-the ordinary con-
sumers of financial products and the stability of financial markets. 202 Un-
like traditional securities, the nature of derivative products creates signifi-
cant uncertainty that hampers serious regulatory development. The
problem is the "unpublic" nature of these financial products, which are
traded by highly sophisticated investors with access to financial institu-
tions and their services. 20 3 Besides the hedging feature of such prod-
ucts,204 the ordinary investor has neither the wealth nor the investment
need to speculate with such products. 205 As a result, financial institutions,
like Barings, and their financially savvy customers dominate derivative
markets.206 This highly selective group of players has numerous interests
in limiting government intervention in its trading activity. Competitive
forces between derivative market participants can best explain the inertia
behind regulatory developments. 207 The existing derivative framework
that contains both jurisdictional and legal uncertainties enhances this
competitive environment.208 As previously analyzed, the hallmark of de-
200. See supra note 198
201. See infra notes 237-58 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Ray Garrett, Jr., New Directions in Professional Responsibility, 29
Bus. LAW. 7 (March 1974) (describing the policy goals of the 1933 Securities Act as an
attempt to "make the world safe for small investors against the depredations of the rob-
ber barons, the princes of privilege, the malefactors of great wealth and the just plain
bandits of earlier days.").
203. See User Profile, DERIVATIVES WK., Dec. 25, 1995, at 5 (profiling derivitive
purchasers and giving insight into the process of making derivative purchase decisions).
204. See Wifnam Glasgall & Greg Bums, Hedging Commandments: Rules to Live
by in A Dangerous Game, Bus. WK., Oct. 31, 1994, at 98 (describing the success of de-
rivative instruments in hedging against market fluctuations and attracting more investors).
205. See id. at 99 (listing the most successful Fortune 100 companies that have used
derivatives).
206. See George A. Walker, Centrepoint: Financial Derivatives-Global Regulatory
Developments, 1996 J.B.L. 66, 70 (Jan. 1996) (describing concentration of derivatives
markets by United States bank dealers).
207. CME Rolling Spot Rolls into Exempt Area, FTURES INDUSTRY, Nov/Dec 1993,
at 15 (commenting about competition between futures exchanges and customized deriva-
tive products and its impact on product development).
208. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 193 (commenting about interpretative variations
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rivative trading is the profit generated from the inherent risk contained in
the product. The presence of risks, especially legal risks, contributes to
the innovation of new financial products. 2°9
The existing securities210 and commodities 21' regulations which have
served as the foundation for subsequent regulatory development provide
an inadequate basis for derivative market reform. While these laws help
to protect financial markets212 and investors213 from gross exploitation and
unnecessary risks,2 14 they cannot be superimposed onto the ultraspecula-
tive market of derivatives. The interplay between securities laws, via the
SEC, and the commodities laws, via the CFTC, reveal such inade-
quacy. 215 The ground-breaking case, Chicago Mercantile Exch. v.
S.E.C.,216 helped to establish some jurisdictional boundaries between
these agencies' control over derivative products.2 17
Jurisdiction aside, each agency's laws have significant limitations to
ensure the financial soundness of derivative instruments. 218 These limita-
tions originate from the heavy regulations that usually apply to the un-
derlying asset or indicia of the derivative instrument rather than to the
for securities within court decisions).
209. See Dropkin et al, supra note 195, at 38 (noting how the exemptions of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 affect the structure of swap transactions).
210. See, e.g., Singher, supra note 10 (footnotes omitted) (citing securities laws that
affect disclosure procedures for derivative instruments, substantive regulations for finan-
cial intermediaries of derivative instruments, and anti-fraud provisions for derivative in-
struments that are outside of the common law).
211. See id. at 1423-27 (footnotes omitted) (detailing the CFTC's regulatory supervi-
sion that covers all futures or commodities exchanged-traded derivative contracts in fi-
tures and options).
212. See id. at 1445 n.378 (discussing how the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
was designed to safeguard markets from fraudulent and manipulative acts).
213. See generally THOMAS L. HAZEN. TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGU-
LATION (2d ed. 1990) (describing the SEC's regulatory activities for preserving investors'
access to accurate securities information).
214. Id.
215. For example, the SEC has recently issued a consent order to recharacterize a
complex derivative transaction as a put option rather than a swap, such that the agency
could assert jurisdiction. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Bankers Trust Settlement: Whither the
Swaps Market?, 213 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1995).
216. 883 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990).
217. Id. at 545-46 (expanding the jurisdiction of the CFTC over transactions that
could be characterized as a security and a future).
218. See Gregory J. Millman, Derivatives as Dump Trucks: They Are Risky, But
They Haul Away the Refuse of Bad Government Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1994, at
C2 (commenting about the mobility of financial institutions and the role of derivatives in
internationalizing and evading domestic regulators).
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derivative itself. 219
1. Some Lessons from the SEC
Derivatives, unlike securities, serve an entirely different economic
function in a transaction. 220 Therefore, any attempt to squeeze derivative
products under the SEC regulatory framework will not be effectual. First,
derivatives have a much smaller investor clientele that utilizes such prod-
ucts for non-traditional business purposes. 22' Second, derivative products
are developed to modify existing assets, like securities, that do not satisfy
an end-user's financial objectives. 222 Third, the business of derivatives
transactions requires ever-changing levels of specialization that hampers
the SEC's ability to provide substantive regulatory oversight for partici-
pating financial intermediaries.223
Fourthly, financial intermediaries, like the former Barings Group,
that deal in derivative products create their own markets for particular
products or, at least, have a strong presence in a particular derivative
product.224 Fifthly, SEC disclosure requirements, correlating to derivative
risks and related information asymmetries, are simply too difficult to im-
plement with any degree of certainty.221 Most importantly, the majority of
SEC regulations, developed in response to a systemic break-down of the
securities markets in the 1930s, do not apply to the resilient derivative
219. See JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 194, § 1.31.
220. The business and economics of securities differ from derivative transactions
that serve highly specialized investment purposes. For example, securities are generally
issued to garner equity investment and usually purchased to pursue a gain. Derivatives
could serve infinite financial objectives. See generally KPMG, supra note 13.
221. See, e.g.; GLOBAL DERIvATIVES STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 38 (discussing
the dominant presence of large corporations in the derivatives market). See also Hu, Mis-
understood Derivatives, supra note 10, at 1464-65 (highlighting sophistication and finan-
cial resources as hallmark of OTC market participants and products).
222. See Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 10, at 996 (commenting about the
uses of "structured" products by financial engineers in nontraditional securities issu-
ances). Structured products are specially designed securities with custom-tailored formulas
for interest or principal payment streams. Id. at 997 n.46.
223. See Dropkin et al., supra note 195, at 38 (describing the development of deriv-
ative products to evade SEC scrutiny). See also GLOBECON GROUP, supra note 46, at 314-
20 (explaining the concept of "regulation lag" on the quickly increasing derivative
markets).
224. See, e.g., William Glasgall & Bill Javetski, Swap Fever: Big Money, Big Risks,
Bus. WK., June 1, 1992, at 102, 103 (commenting about the relationship between high
credit-rated banking institutions and traders with particular derivative products and
markets).
225. See Singher, supra note 10, at 1421 n.203 (citing aspects of the mandatory dis-
closure requirements that are inadequate for certain derivative products).
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markets of the 1990s. 226
2. Some Lessons from the CFTC
Commodities laws provide similar piecemeal regulatory remedies
that exacerbate the inadequacy of securities laws. The limited commodi-
ties and futures transactions that are within the CFTC authority can be
considered too narrow to provide a regulatory foundation for derivative
transactions. 227 As with the SEC, the CFTC was established to regulate
the trading of commodities and related contracts, not to regulate the ex-
tended financial services and attendant risks of derivative products.22
Recent modifications to the CFTC's regulatory authority have helped
to remedy jurisdictional ambiguities between the SEC and the CFTC. 229
These modifications 230 have primarily enabled the agency to monitor the
innovation of swap products. 231
The benefactors of the CFTC's discretionary powers can support
some speculation about the financial lobbying interests behind the Trea-
sury Amendment232 to the Commodity Exchange Act.233 International fi-
226. See Garrett, supra note 202, at 8 (commenting about how the regulatory system
has preserved the securities markets from the abuses of the 1930s and their impact on the
overall economy).
227. See, e.g., Singher, supra note 10, at 1423-24 (footnotes omitted) (citing reasons
for the enactment of the Commodities and Exchange Act and the creation of the CFTC,
particularly the Federal Government's supervision of agricultural commodities and com-
modity futures and options contracts respectively).
228. Id.
229. See Levy, supra note 10, at 2009-11 (footnotes omitted) (explaining how the
Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 (FTPA) and the SEC/CFTC Jurisdictional Accord
define the regulatory functions of each agency). The SEC/CFTC Accord allocated juris-
diction between these agencies through placing options on securities or securities indicies
outside CFTC's jurisdictional reach. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(i) (1988 & Supp. V
1993)). The FITA permits the CFTC to exempt certain futures contracts from regulatory
oversight. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(5)(B) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993)).
230. The Treasury Amendment of the Commodity Exchange Act achieved these
modifications. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This amendment affects security
rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securities, or
mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, unless such transactions involve the sale
thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1988
& Supp. 1993). See also Singher, supra note 10, at 1425-28, nn.229-31 (citing the
CFTC's swap exemptions and explaining their requirements).
231. See, e.g., Daniel P. Cunningham et al., An Introduction to OTC Derivatives, in
SWAPS AND OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1994, at 164 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B4-7062, 1994) (describing the attractiveness of overseas swap
markets before the CFTC's exemptions of swap agreements).
232. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
233. For example, the eligibility requirements for swap exemptions affect a particu-
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nancial players, for example, who wished to avoid conflict with foreign
regulators, might have sought the non-U.S. currency exemptions. 2 4 These
exemptions also encourage more innovations in non-U.S. currency prod-
ucts that may help dealers and end-users evade CFTC regulations and
corresponding transaction costs.235
The impact of these exemptions indicates that the financial lobbying
interests have no common uniform legislative goal. Otherwise, special
exemptions would not be needed to satisfy particular interests in particu-
lar markets. 236
3. Some Lessons from U.S. Bank Regulation
Derivative regulations also attach from the financial institutions that
use them. The large presence of commercial banks in the derivative mar-
kets237 enables U.S. banking regulators to increase their oversight of de-
lar class of product users who must have had some involvement in the legislative process.
Some eligibility requirements for a swap transaction to fit within the CFTC exemption
include
(a) The swap agreement is entered into solely between eligible swap participants at
the time such persons enter into the swap agreement;
(b) The swap agreement is not part of a fungible class of agreements that are stan-
dardized as to their material economic terms;
(c) The creditworthiness of any party having an actual or potential obligation under
the swap agreement would be a material consideration in entering into or deter-
mining the terms of the swap agreement, including pricing, cost, or credit en-
hancement terms of the swap agreement; and
(d) The swap agreement is not entered into and traded on or through a multilateral
transaction execution facility.
17 C.F.R. § 35.2 (1997).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106
Stat. 3590 (1992) (detailing Congressional attention on hybrids, swaps, forwards, and
bank accounts and the role of CFTC exemptions on these instruments).
237. Based on notional principal amounts, the top ten U.S. commercial banks that
deal in derivative products are:
Bank Total Derivatives (U.S. $ in millions)
Chemical Bank 3,185,185
Citicorp NA 2,608,869
Morgan Guaranty TC 2,426,414
Bankers TC 2,114,580
Chase Manhattan BK NA 1,369,821
Bank of America NT & SA 1,312,890
First Nat. Bank of Chicago 624,401
Nationsbank of North Carolina NA 505,306
Republic Bank of New York 235,994
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rivative transactions. These regulators include the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB), 238 the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC), 2 9 and, indi-
rectly, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).240 Such regula-
tors justify their presence in this market through the need to monitor the
risk levels of derivative products in banking operations.241
These three regulatory bodies greatly contributed to the presence of
American banks in the derivative market for three reasons. First, bank
regulatory oversight fostered investor confidence in the institutions that
deal with such risky products.242 Secondly, such investor confidence ena-
bled these institutions to innovate more risky and complex derivative
products.243 Most importantly, the rate of evolution of these derivative
products 244 and their role in U.S. banks' profitability meant that banks
Bank of America, ILL. 98,608
Walker, supra note 206, at 71 n.23 (citing 1994 reports from U.S. banks).
238. See, e.g., Dropkin et al., supra note 195, at 52 (describing approval require-
ments for banks to enter contracts where there exists no right to purchase the underlying
asset).
239. Id. (describing OCC oversight of banks' asset/liability management programs
and their dealer/broker trading activities.)
240. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RE-
SERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 150-51 (1939) (commenting about the role of
deposit insurance in management operations to maintain adequate capital levels for insti-
tutional activities).
241. Banking regulators' efforts are centered around one aspect of the derivative
product- risk-and its impact on the capital operations of banks' financial health. See,
e.g., GLOBECON GROUP, supra note 46, at 315-19 (discussing the role of capital adequacy
requirements to cover derivative risks). Derivatives constitute assets that warrant consider-
ation in the calculation of these banks' risks. See 12 C.FR. pt. 325 appendix A (1997)
(identifying derivative instruments based on the nature of their credit risks). The OCC,
the FRB, and the FDIC continue to monitor the capital adequacy ratios which are meant
to safeguard against undercapitalized banks and their impact on systemic risk to the U.S.
banking industry. See, e.g., GLOBECON GROUP, supra note 46, at 319 (commenting about
the increased systemic risks from derivative transactions, the interdependence of global fi-
nancial markets, and their impact on U.S. bank regulators).
For an excellent technical discussion about capital adequacy guidelines on an
agency-by-agency basis, see Singher, supra note 10, at 1428-31 nn.255-65 (discussing
OCC oversight of banks' investment portfolios, valuation calculations, and its impact on
the liquidity of the American Banking System; and the FDIC's administration of deposit
insurance that instills depositor confidence and provides funding for deposit-oriented
banks and their derivative operations).
242. See, e.g., GLOBECON GROUP, supra note 46, at 316 (discussing the role of bank-
ing institutions in minimizing the credit risks with counterparties).
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., id. at 55-56 (explaining the three year life cycle of certain swap prod-
ucts that included introduction, growth, maturity, and decline).
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could commandeer regulatory developments. 245 The prominence of Amer-
ican banks in the trading of derivative products supports this
hypothesis.246
Banks have entered the derivatives business to exploit new revenue
sources as their traditional lending activities have turned less profitable.
247
The off-balance sheet nature of derivative products might explain why
banks originally explored this market. 24 The high-credit rating of bank-
ing institutions have also helped to attract investors into the OTC deriva-
tives market and create a sense of stability, knowing that a counterparty's
obligation would be satisfied.249 Most importantly, the competition be-
tween banking and financial institutions influenced commercial banks to
expand their services through derivative products.2s0 Without a doubt, de-
245. See id. at 314-15 (discussing the concept of "regulation lag"). The rapid devel-
opment of new derivative products and its impact on regulatory efforts to gain a signifi-
cant supervisory position of the derivative markets is known as regulation lag. Id.
246. See Walker, supra note 206, at 70-72.
247. The 1980s contained a major evolution in the function and purpose of the
American Banking system. Two major events badly hurt the profitability of American
banks and contributed to their low rankings against other international financial institu-
tions. See, e.g., Shuman, supra note 2, at 10 (discussing the low rankings of U.S. banking
institutions in 1992). First, Third World countries defaulted on their debt obligations
which, in turn, required restructuring of international revenue sources. See ITZHAK SWARY
& BARRY TOPF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEREGULATION: COMMERCIAL'BANKING AT THE CROSS-
ROADS 3 (1994). More importantly, the FRB's monetary policy that pursued a zero-
inflation strategy reduced the profitability of banks' lending activities. Id. The incentive
and talent to exploit alternative revenue sources compelled banks to offer other financial
service products, especially derivatives. See generally Shuman, supra note 2.
248. See GLOBECON GROUP, supra note 46, at 316 (describing how a swap is a syn-
thetic off-balance sheet products that essentially represents a loan to a counterparty that
would normally be included on a bank's balance sheet). "Off-balance sheet" refers to a
bank's risk exposure on particular items that are not included in the calculations for a
bank's capital adequacy ratios. See generally Frederick M. Struble & Norah Barger, Inter-
national Capital Standards for Banking Institutions, in REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS:
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL 4-1 (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner eds., 2d ed. 1995). The
OCC, along with other domestic and international regulators, aggressively monitors such
products. See id. at 4-4 (explaining the international risk-based capital framework and its
impact on 1994 capital adequacy guidelines that were issued by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System). See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CUR-
RENCY. RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (1994) (outlining the OCC's role
in regulation).
249. See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
250. See Shuman, supra note 2, at 12 (discussing the impact of the Glass-Steagall
Act on the international activities of U.S. commercial banks). The Glass-Steagall Act gen-
erally separates commercial banking (i.e. lending and deposits) from securities underwrit-
ing (i.e. dealing in corporate debt or equity). Id. See also Schwimmer, supra note 53, at 9
(commenting about U.S. banks' derivative activities and their impact on legislative at-
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rivative products have contributed to the recent profitability of American
banks throughout the 1990s.
The conflict between the financial objectives of derivative market
participants and the policy constraints on U.S. bank regulators illustrates
some problems with future regulatory developments. For example, be-
cause the Federal Reserve monitors the financial integrity of banking ac-
tivity, its valuation of these products' risks and benefits greatly varies
from the banks that use them.251 The Federal Reserve's recent pre-
commitment approach acknowledges this conflict, allowing banks more
freedom to calculate risk and to operate accordingly.252
4. U.S. Regulatory Lessons Revisited
The unifying theme amongst these compartmentalized and frag-
mented regulatory agencies is their need for information about the finan-
cial products and the agency's basis for assessing their risks.253 The im-
portance of acquiring such information can be observed in the voluntary
agreements and regulations that affect derivative transactions.25 4 The
tempts to reform the Glass-Steagall Act).
The competitive influences from mutual funds, mortgage banks, and finance compa-
nies also affect the search for alternative, regulatory-friendly financial instruments. See,
e.g., Shuman, supra note 2, at 13.
251. See, e.g, Lustgarten & Ma, supra note 44, at 102 (citing the Federal Reserve
Trading Manual and its value-at-risk approach to calculate market risk levels in banking
activities). The value-at-risk approach uses a pricing model to examine potential changes
in market positions of an institution or its portfolio. Id. The Federal Reserve permits the
use of other risk measures that are similarly accurate and rigorous. Id. at 103.
252. See Fox, supra note 3 (explaining the Federal Reserve's pre-commitment ap-
proach). This approach permits banks to use their own calculations to determine appropri-
ate capital levels for their trading positions. Id. If a bank's trading activity produces more
losses than its capital levels can sustain, then the bank will face penalties. Id.
253. See, e.g., Washington Update, Wallman Announces SEC Derivatives and Market
Risk Proposal, J. AcCT., Dec. 1995, at 15 [hereinafter Washington Update] (explaining the
quantitative and qualitative risk disclosure requirements for proposed amendments to SEC
regulation about derivatives and related financial products).
Quantitative requirements include the presentation of material exposure to market
risks through tabular presentation of future cash flows, results of sensitivity and shock
analysis with certain financial variables, and value-at-risk exposure from normal market
movements. Id.
Qualitative requirements include a company's discussion of primary risk exposures,
management objectives and strategies for managing risk, and a contextual basis to under-
stand these requirements. Id.
254. See, e.g., Global Regulation Gathers Pace, FIN. REG. REPORT, May 1995, at 1
(commenting about the joint guidelines, issued by the Basle Committee and the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), about the information parameters
needed to evaluate derivative risks in banking and securities institutions' operations).
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ISDA and similar non-governmental associations have encouraged infor-
mation-sharing agreements between exchanges on which derivatives are
traded 55 They also encouraged compliance with standardized accounting
procedures 256 to minimize miscalculations and misleading information.25 7
The problem with these associations and their policies is their members'
self-serving interests.25s
5. Some Lessons from Leeson
The Barings Crisis demonstrated the effectiveness of the existing
regulatory framework and strengthened international cooperative ef-
255. See, e.g., Laurie Morse, Survey of Derivatives, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1995, at 2
(describing the Unified Clearing Group and its information-sharing agreement between
the clearing division of 19 U.S. securities and futures exchanges).
256. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) promulgates accounting
standards that relate the intended use of a derivative instrument with the economics of a
transaction. See KPMG, supra note 13, at 41-50 (explaining variations in Financial Ac-
counting Standards (FAS) for hedge accounting, such as FAS 52 and its application to
forward-based foreign exchange contracts and FAS 80 and its application to non-currency
futures and forward contracts). See also Washington Update, supra note 253 (quoting the
SEC Commissioner about the role of FASB in derivative regulations, especially FASB
Statement No. 119 and its impact on disclosing information about derivative activities,
even off-balance sheet instruments).
Accounting standards also affect international organizations and their adoption of
disclosure standards for derivative risk. See, e.g, Mario Monti, Regional Financial Areas:
The EU Experience and Future Prospects, Speech from the JOSCO Conference, July 13,
1995, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, RAPID file (commenting about a potential
adoption of international accounting standards between IOSCO and IASC (International
Accountings Standards Committee)). Besides improving reliance on risk calculations, har-
monized accounting standards would help to remove many anomalies from international
financial transactions. See, e.g., Marcel Michelson, Regulators Spotlight Barings, Ac-
counting Standards, REuTERS, BC CYCLE, July 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, TXTNWS File (illustrating problematic transnational accounting standards that
made Diamler-Benz AG report a loss under American standards and a profit under Ger-
man rules).
257. See KPMG, supra note 13, at 68-71 (detailing Statement of Financial Account-
ing Standards No. 119 and its role in disclosing information about derivative instruments',
market risks and their impact on a firm's risk management strategy).
258. See Floyd Norris, Progress Seen in Accounting Board Dispute But SEC Chair-
man Doesn't Give Details, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1996, at D3 (noting the concern of the
SEC chairman about the selection process for the FASB). The interest groups that are
most effected by FASB rules play a major role in selecting FASB members. Id.
Similar self-serving interest group pressure is present in derivative organizations. For
example, the role of derivatives dealers in preparing voluntary conduct guidelines, known
as Principles and Practices for Wholesale Financial Transactions, has received much criti-
cism for its dealer-oriented biases. See Morse, supra note 255.
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forts. 259 Voluntary agreements, in particular, were the hallmark of such
efforts.260 These agreements re-enforced the resilience of derivative mar-
kets and their ability to handle such large losses. 261 Because each group
of derivatives players perceived a different threat from the Barings Cri-
sis2 2 and sought to remedy it accordingly, 263 no major international regu-
latory policies were implemented. The only consensus amongst these
groups was the desire to form a united front and to keep government reg-
ulators out of the markets.26
4
This cacophony of financial interests can further explain the limited
development of U.S. regulation in the derivative market.265 Two justifica-
tions can be offered for such legislative inaction. Firstly, the financial in-
terests behind' derivative products and their lobbying presence probably
could not have formed a unified strategy to support a singular legislative
proposal. 26 Secondly, the agencies that enforced the existing regulations
and their jurisdictional divisions probably would have been skeptical of
new legislation reallocating powers. 267 In this author's opinion, legislative
inaction will continue until derivative participants can identify mutually
exclusive interests that can be addressed by regulation. 268
259. See supra notes 177-90 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Coggan, supra note 91, at 5 (describing how SIMEX managed to set-
tle Barings accounts and to commence trading shortly after the bank's collapse).
262. See supra notes 149-76 and accompanying text.
263. See, e.g., Lapper, supra note 79, at 1 (discussing recent trends in swap transac-
tions and the shift from high margin to low margin transactions to reduce risk exposure).
264. See, e.g., Barings Shows Need for Derivative Self-Regulation, REUTERS, BC CY-
CLE, Sept. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File (describing the
expert consensus that the best form of regulation is self-regulation).
265. See, e.g., Futures Marts Launch Lobbying Efforts to Fight Backlash Against
Derivatives, WALL ST. L-TER, Oct. 2, 1995, at 1 (explaining how the futures exchanges,
like CBOT and CME, have used lobbying efforts to educate state legislators about their
products). The potential loss of investment activity from public pension funds and munic-
ipalities have concerned these futures exchanges about state legislators' attempts to re-
strict such derivative use. Id.
266. See, e.g., Derivatives Back on the Table for Congress Next Year, WALL ST.
LETTER, Sept. 18, 1995, at 2 (stating that the ISDA did not support "derivative-specific
legislation," such as the bills introduced by the Chairman of the House Banking Commit-
tee, Jim Leach (R-IA), and Ed Markey (D-MA), because the ISDA believed existing de-
rivatives regulation was sufficient).
267. See supra notes 200-52 and accompanying text.
268. The current regulatory policies have attracted investors into the derivatives
markets through their ability to instill investor confidence and to enable firms to develop
more complex derivative contracts. See GLOBECON GROUP, supra note 46, at 316-25 (ex-
plaining the impact of regulations on U.S. banks and their role as intermediaries for de-
rivative products).
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B. The Significance of Clearinghouse Operations and Procedures in
the Development of Derivative Regulation
As discussed in Part III, the rules of derivative exchanges greatly
contributed to the unauthorized trading activity of Nick Leeson.269 The
margin requirements, time-delays, and other basic differences between
SIMEX and OSE played a major role in the Barings Crisis. 270 The
clearinghouse mechanisms, more than the actual derivative products
themselves, create the biggest threat to derivative transactions. Regulatory
efforts cannot discount the need for increased harmonization in clearing-
house operations, especially with regard to the rules and procedures for
derivative trading.271
A clearinghouse for derivative products that are standardized and
traded on organized exchanges, compared to OTC derivative products
that are non-standardized and traded between individual parties, is an im-
portant component of the transaction.272 The clearinghouse's function as a
counterparty to all derivative transactions justifies this importance. 273 All
exchange-traded derivative purchasers (i.e. contract holders) bear the
credit risk of and receive the security from initial and variation margin
contributions from each exchange member.274
An exchange's clearinghouse also helps to reduce transaction costs
for derivatives market participants. Harmonized collection procedures for
margin requirements, instantaneous compilation of price movements, and
heightened scrutiny of derivative traders through membership require-
ments, reduce such transaction costs.2 75 Most importantly, the clearing-
house continues to ensure that the derivative contract's financial obliga-
tions are satisfied by the appropriate parties through clearinghouse
269. See supra notes 149-76 and accompanying text.
270. See id.
271. See Safety and Soundness Issues Related to Bank Derivatives Activities-Part
III: Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103rd Con-
gress 50-52 (1993) (Minority Report) (commenting about the role of clearinghouses in the
development of derivatives regulations).
272. See Karol, supra note 10, at 198 (explaining how an exchanged-traded contract
holder bears the credit risk of the exchange's clearinghouse and benefits from its financial
strength).
273. Id.
274. Id. See also Coggan, supra note 91, at 5 (noting SIMEX's financial ability to
weather Barings outstanding market positions and its impact on investor confidence in
Singapore's financial markets).
275. See generally Dwight B. Crane et al., THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A
FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Harvard Business School, Global Financial System Project, ed.
1995).
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rules.2 76
Clearinghouses, such as FEDWIRE,277 CHIPs, 27 and SWIFT, 279 were
essential in the expansion of international financial services. 20 These in-
ternational clearinghouses ensured the rapidity and the precision of trans-
actions that enabled almost any financial objective to be accomplished
across boarders and time zones.281 They have also helped to implement
important procedural operations to overcome market inefficiencies from
trading in numerous time zones. 28 2 Transnational transactions greatly de-
pend on clearinghouses to develop innovative services and to exploit in-
vestment opportunities across boarders. 23 Banks, along with other finan-
cial institutions, have greatly benefited from the expanded markets that
clearinghouses enabled them to access. 28 4 Moreover, governments have
increased their supervision of these institution's financial transactions
through clearinghouse operations. 28 5
276. Id.
277. FEDWIRE is a payment system that is operated and guaranteed by the Federal
Reserve Board (FRB). See ANTHONY SAUNDERS & INGO WALTER, UNIVERSAL BANKING IN
THE UNITED STATES: WHAT COULD WE GAIN? WHAT COULD WE LOSE? 211-12 (1994).
The FRB's guarantee facilitates access to FEDWIRE-transferred funds, even before settle-
ment occurs between the banking institutions. Id.
278. CHIPS is the Clearing House Interbank Payments System, a private payments
network, that operates between 140 domestic and foreign banks. Id.
279. SWIFT is the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, a
Belgian non-profit cooperative, that connects banks throughout the world and enables
them to conduct international financial transactions. J. ORLIN GRABBE, INTERNATIONAL FI-
NANCIAL MARKETS 60 (1986).
280. See, e.g., Perold, supra note 97, at 33-41 (describing how these payment sys-
tems, their guarantees, and their technology contributed to the expansion of international
banking operations throughout the 1980s).
281. Id.
282. Herstatt risk, originating from asymmetric payment and delivery procedures
across different time zones, was a major concern in international transactions that clear-
inghouses helped to eliminate through providing performance guarantees. See id. at 38.
283. See SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note 277, at 38-44 (discussing the impor-
tance of technology and information access in the geographical diversity of U.S. banking
activities, especially the volume of foreign exchange transactions and swaps that contrib-
uted to U.S. banking profitability).
284. Id.
285. See, e.g., Coggan, supra note 91, at 5 (discussing the role of the Singapore
Government in providing support for SIMEX and its ability to meet margin payments to
some members).
Clearinghouses have proved so successful in reducing derivatives-related risks that a
joint statement between America's Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, and Britain's Securities Investment Board advocates multi-
lateral clearing agreements as part of regulatory developments. See Singher, supra note
10, at 1468 n.517 (citing the joint statement's observations about clearinghouses and the
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Risk and pricing calculations for derivative products have consist-
ently plagued the market.2 6 Clearinghouses and their function on the ex-
changes where such products are traded could overcome previous calcu-
lation problems for numerous reasons. Firstly, clearinghouses are at the
best point in the derivative transaction to determine a derivative's price
as well as the value of its risks. 287 Secondly, clearinghouses have a
proven success-record in the previous expansion of other financial ser-
vices, especially those services connecting with banking activities. 288 Fi-
nally, banking regulators, both domestic and foreign, have had tremen-
dous success at limiting systemic risk in the banking system through
promulgating clearinghouse regulations. 289
Even though one can only conjecture about the role of clearing-
houses in the development of derivative regulation, one cannot underesti-
mate their importance. Future developments in the regulation of exchange
clearinghouses would help to cover traded, standardized derivative con-
tracts. These derivative products, unlike OTC contracts, were recently in-
volved in highly-publicized losses. 29°
Applying new regulations to the clearinghouse operations of deriva-
tive regulations, the government might accomplish greater harmonization
amongst computer trading systems, posting techniques, and risk valuation
formulas. Part VI further develops the type of clearinghouse-oriented de-
rivative regulation which would best serve international financial and
government interests.
C. The Potential of International Regulatory Efforts to Preserve the
Stability of Global Finance
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee),
under the control of the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), has
regulator's desire to use similar clearing arrangements in the OTC market as well).
286. See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 277-82 and accompanying text.
289. See Walker, supra note 206, at 83-84 (citing the Lamfalussy Report on In-
terbank Netting Schemes by the Basle Committee in July 1994).
[It was accepted that arrangements for interbank payment orders and forward-
value contractual commitments, such as foreign exchange contracts and swaps,
could improve the efficiency and stability of interbank settlements by reducing
costs as well as credit and liquidity risks.]
Id. at 84.
290. See, e.g., McClintock, supra note 8, at 25 (cataloging derivative losses from
Metallgesellschaft ($2.1 Billion), Orange County ($2.1 Billion), and Barings ($1.6
Billion)).
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greatly contributed to the stability of global financial markets.291 The BIS
is considered to be the international central bank because it is the most
powerful international institution that can unite the industrial nations'
central banks behind an international banking policy.292 With its previous
successes, the BIS must be considered as a potential source of derivative
regulation. 293 The current proposal by the Basle Committee about report-
ing requirements for derivatives represents its latest effort to create a reg-
ulatory solution.294
The Basle Committee Report on Derivative Trading 295 can be re-
garded as another effort to maintain the stability of global financial mar-
kets.296 The gravamen of this proposal is the Committee's goal to control
risk through promulgating uniform capital adequacy ratios.297 The com-
mittee also embraced the principle that international banking activities
should be subject to "prudential supervision with less operational
intervention. '298
Regulatory considerations focused on the role of derivatives in inter-
national banking operations. Firstly, proposed regulations acknowledged
the increased risk of insolvency that such products add to the system.299
Secondly, international proposals hoped to preserve the autonomy of na-
291. RAI K. BHALA, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AFTER BCCI 207-19 (1994) (ex-
plaining major accomplishments and their impact on international financial transactions).
292. Id.
293. See generally BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, FRAMEWORK FOR
SUPERVISORY INFORMATION ABOUT THE DERIVATIVES AcTIvITIEs OF BANKS AND SECURITIES
FIRMS (1995).
294. Id.
295. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision represents a committee of bank-
ing supervisors that conducts studies and promotes convergence of regulatory practices.
See Timothy Haosen Wan, Comparative Approaches to Regulatory "Safety and Sound-
ness," in INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: CHANGE AND TRANS-
FORMATION IN THE 1990s 261, 263-67 (J.J. Norton et al. eds., 1994).
296. Id.
297. See Fox, supra note 3 (explaining the Committee's proposal for determining
the required capital levels for their trading risks). Under the proposal, banks could use ei-
ther their own internal market risk models or a standardized regulatory formula. Id. If
banks use their own formulas, then domestic banking regulators are urged to multiply that
figure by a factor of three to compensate for underestimations. Id. Based on this proposal,
the final capital requirement would be the higher figure between the standardized figure
and the modified bank figure. Id.
298. See BASLE COMMITEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION OF
BANKS' DERIVATIVES AcnvrriEs, Part IV (Dec. 1994).
299. See Walker, supra note 206, at 77-78 (noting how the compilation and dissemi-
nation of statistics on derivative trading could assist monitoring and reduce market risks)
(citing BIS, Issues of Measurement Related to Market Size and Micro Prudential Risks in
Derivatives Markets, "The Brockmeijer Report," Feb. 1995).
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tional banking policies from excessive derivative speculation. a00 Thirdly,
regulatory reforms identified the conflict of interest problems between the
production, the sale, and the usage of derivative services and their impact
on potential trading abuses. 301 Finally, government incentives have recog-
nized that the concentration of derivative transactions in a few financial
houses, especially American banks, creates competitive problems, such as
barriers to entry.30 2
The Basle Committee's major focus, like American regulatory ef-
forts,30 3 is on capital adequacy guidelines which require uniform risk-
measuring efforts. 30 4 The notional value of derivative products, along
with their appropriate quantity of risk, warrants an international effort. 305
The Basle Committee has already established a risk-based framework that
is used to assess capital in relation to credit risk. 3°6 Such a framework
can be considered a major incentive for the creation and expansion of
global financial products and services throughout the 1980s, as well as
the source of stability for continuing international banking business. This
uniformity has also helped to minimize transaction costs because risks
could be better evaluated and financial services could be purchased in an
open-market, financially sound atmosphere.307
The relationship between international banking and derivative trad-
ing has contributed to current debate on how to treat derivative risks on
banks' balance sheets. As illustrated in the Barings Crisis, there exists a
strong need for harmonization and standardization in the calculation of
300. See id. at 73-75 (discussing the impact of derivatives growth on undermining
traditional monetary policies through increased international interbank linkages) (citing
BIS, Recent Developments in International Interbank Relations, "The Promisel Report,"
Oct. 1992).
301. See id. at 84 (explaining the committee's finding about comprehensive internal
controls and audit procedures for effective risk management strategies by a fi-m's board
of directors and senior management) (citing Basle Committee, Strengthening Banks' Man-
agement of Derivatives Activity, July 1994).
302. See Shuman, supra note 2, at 11 (describing the financial engineering prowess
of U.S. banks and its impact on creating worldwide demand for their services). But see
GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 53-55 (explaining why there exists
no positive correlation between size of and risk in derivative markets).
303. See infra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
304. See infra notes 309-15 and accompanying text.
305. See Walker, supra note 206, at 70 (quoting value of derivative market at $15.3
Trillion) (citing Comptroller of the Currency, Fact Sheet, News Release, Mar. 31, 1995).
306. See, e.g. Walker, supra note 206, at 82 (discussing the Basle Committee's Cap-
ital Accord (1988) that established a risk-based capital framework to handle off-balance
sheet exposures) (citing Basle Committee, 1988 Capital Accord (July 1988)).
307. See infra notes 320-22 and accompanying text.
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such risk.308. This harmonization would greatly assist domestic and for-
eign bank regulators in their supervision of derivatives markets.
Currently, the debate on harmonizing market-risk capital rules is
centered around the role of banks in valuing the risk from their deriva-
tive-related activities. The Basle Committee's current proposal attempts to
reconcile the tension between a standardized regulatory formula and
banks' internal formulas for the calculation of risk. The Basle Committee
advocates that banks can either use a standardized risk formula in the
calculation of derivative risk or the bank can employ its own risk
formula.3°9 However, if a bank opts for its own formula, then that value
must be multiplied by a factor of three to minimize potential exploitation
of banks' own beneficial miscalculations. 10 The European Capital Ade-
quacy Directive closely resembles the standardized component of the Ba-
sle Committee proposal.3 '
The FRB also has developed its own proposal for banks' calculation
of risk value, known as the pre-commitment approach.31 2 This approach
allows banks to set aside their own reserve amounts for derivative trad-
ing activities and, if trading losses should exceed that limit, then banks
would have to face appropriate penalties. 313 The policy rationale behind
this approach is to give firms more incentives to strengthen risk-manage-
ment systems and to increase management oversights of their trading
books. 31 4
Another point of disagreement between the Basle Committee and the
FRB concerning derivative trading is the treatment of netting in the cal-
culation of banks' capital adequacy ratios.315 The process encourages
more creative financing because numerous transactions can be conglom-
erated and used to reduce risk values. 316 The Basle Committee wants
308. See supra notes 137-69 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 297.
310. Id.
311. See EU Proposes Changes to Derivatives Risk Coverage, REUTERS, BC CYcLE,
May 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File (quoting an EU official
about the Solvency Ratio Directive that the proposal is the same as the Basle Regula-
tions). See also Fox, supra note 3 (explaining how the EU Capital Adequacy Directive
precludes the Basle Committee from considering the Fed's Pre-Commitment Approach).
312. See supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
313. See Fox, supra note 3, at 4.
314. See id.
315. See id. Netting is the process which reduces "exposure between two
counterparties by canceling out transactions with off-setting cash-flows, then calculating
the mark-to-market replacement cost of the resulting exposure." GLOBECON GROUP, supra
note 46, at 319.
316. See GLOBECON GROUP, supra note 46, at 319 (explaining how the measurement
of risk can either overstate or understate the notional amount of a transaction).
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greater control over all conformity measures and discourages netting ar-
rangements. 317 The FRB, on the other hand, permits U.S. banks to net de-
rivative exposures.318 This divergence reflects each institution's ideology
about the degree of regulation that should be present in banks' derivative
transactions.
D. Why International Derivative Reform Cannot Occur from within the
Existing International Regulatory Schemata
The tensions between the Basle Committee proposal and the FRB's
pre-commitment approach represent the divergence of financial interests
that are currently served by derivative regulatory inaction. The Basle
Committee has embraced the European Directive and, thus, will become
more involved in banks' derivative transactions. The FRB, on the other
hand, wants banks to continue their success with derivative products and
to police their own derivative transactions.
Neither European financial firms nor banks have had success in the
derivative markets to the extent of their American counterparts. 19 Basle's
adoption of the European Directive can be seen as an attack on
America's comparative advantage in derivative financial services. The
Basle Committee's Market-Risk Capital Rules only apply to 25 major
U.S. banks that face major compliance costs and some smaller financial
institutions that are minimally affected.320 More importantly, the Euro-
pean Capital Adequacy Directive precludes the Basle Committee from
considering the FRB's pre-commitment approach. 32'
As the most prominent international banking regulator, the Basle
Committee cannot be fully entrusted to manage derivative policy. Its rela-
tionship with the European Community and America's comparative ad-
vantage mean that another, non-partisan international regulatory agency
must evolve. 322 Any institutions, like the Basle Committee and the BIS,
that deal with the substantive elements of financial transactions, espe-
cially derivatives, will be vulnerable to political and economic interests.
Any new international effort will need to concentrate on the procedural
317. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 10, at 1458 & 1513 n.11 (dis-
cussing the general approach of the Basle Committee in regulating derivatives).
318. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4407 (West Supp. 1997). These sections ensure
that bilateral netting arrangements will be accepted between clients. Id.
319. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
320. See Fox, supra note 3.
321. Id.
322. See id. (discussing the voting composition of the Basle Committee with one
vote for American regulators and seven votes for the European Community).
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and mechanical aspects of the derivative market.3 23 These areas will be
less vulnerable to special interest manipulation and provide a means to
collect transactional information about risks and values that can help do-
mestic and international banking regulators.3 24
V. U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICE AGREEMENT OF THE
GATS AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON SUPRANATIONAL BANKING
AND DERIVATIVE REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
Recent Congressional debates on U.S. banking reform,325 as well as
corresponding derivative legislation proposals, 326 warrant more attention
on the Financial Service Agreement of the GATS.3 27 In the absence of
such attention, America might be precluded from important contributions
to the new supranational regulatory order in financial services.3 28 More
importantly, the only existing international banking institution with simi-
lar influence, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, cannot form
an international consensus on the regulation of derivative transactions.3 29
America's current opposition to the Financial Service Agreement of
the GATS,330 its domestic regulatory barriers to universal banking,33' and
323. See supra notes 308-13 and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 10, at 1508 (analyzing the
need for openness and universalism in derivatives market to garner information about val-
uations, pricing models, and risk levels).
325. See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, Banks' Access to Wall Street May Widen -
Fed Proposes New Rules To Weaken 'Firewalls', N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at Dl
(describing recent modifications to banks' securities-generated income activities);
Roukema Highlights U.S. Thrift Charter, Reg Relief, REUTERs, BC CYCLE, Feb. 7, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Bankg Library, CURNWS File (commenting about chairwoman of a
House Banking subcommittee that has undertaken efforts to accelerate banking regulatory
reforms). See also Lawrence H. Summers, Protecting Our Nation's Finances, remarks
before the Securities Industry Association (Mar. 5, 1996), reprinted in FDCH FED. DEP'T
AND AGENCY DOCUMENTS, Mar. 5, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File.
326. See, e.g., Derivatives Back on The Table for Congress Next Year, WALL ST.
LETTER, Sept. 18, 1995, at 2.
327. See Summers, supra note 325 (commenting about liberalization'in financial ser-
vices through the GATS and its impact on America's competitive position in this
industry).
328. Id.
329. See supra notes 308-18 and accompanying text.
330. See Hearing on International Trade: Implementation Issues Concerning the
WTO: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade, House Ways and Means Committee
(1996), reprinted in FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY,
March 13, 1996, available in NEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (statement of JayEtta
Z. Hecker) [hereinafter Hecker Testimony] (describing the U.S. commitments to the WTO
not to discriminate against existing foreign financial service providers operating in the
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its preferences for bilateral financial service agreements,332 have impor-
tant consequences for the future development of international derivative
regulations. These consequences include many aspects of domestic and
international banking operations. 33 Firstly, the creation of supranational
U.S.) However, the U.S. refrained from guaranteeing to foreign financial services provid-
ers complete market access and national treatment by taking a "most-favored-nation ex-
emption." Id.
Specifically, the U.S. commitment did not include guarantees about the future
for new foreign firms or already established firms wishing to expand services in
the U.S. market. Despite consistent U.S. warnings, the decision to take the ex-
emption surprised many other countries and made them concerned about the
overall U.S. commitment to [the] WTO. The U.S. exemption in financial ser-
vices was taken because U.S. negotiators, in consultation with the private sec-
tor, concluded that other countries' offers to open their markets to U.S. financial
services firms, especially those of certain developing countries, were insufficient
to justify broader U.S. commitments (with no most-favored-nation exemption).
Id. Most-favored-nation trading policy represents a domestic country's obligation to treat
a foreign country's or its citizen's economic activities "at least as favorably as it treats
the activities of any other country." JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 136
(1989).
331. See, e.g., Sarah A. Wagman, Laws Separating Commercial Banking and Securi-
ties Activities as an Impediment to Free Trade in Financial Services: A Comparative
Study of Competitiveness in the International Market for Financial Services, 15 MiCH. J.
INT'L L. 999, 1023-25 (1994) (discussing the U.S. separation of securities and banking
activities and its impact on international trade in financial services).
332. See Summers, supra note 325 (describing U.S. Treasury support for bilateral fi-
nancial service agreements while referring to the success of the U.S.-Japan Agreement
that already enabled two U.S. firms to commence management of Japanese public pen-
sion funds). Bilateral efforts also enhance U.S. diplomatic policies. Id. (describing
America's role in urging Hungry, Korea, and Poland to seek OECD membership). The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) constitutes another in-
ternational arrangement between 24 countries. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 275 (3d ed. 1995). Among other ac-
tivities, it "adopts codes or guidelines applicable to capital movements and multinational
enterprises." Id.
333. See, e.g., BHALA, supra note 291, at 91 (describing how the Foreign Bank Su-
pervision Enhancement Act of 1991 and its manipulation of deposit insurance created an-
other non-tariff barrier). 12 U.S.C. § 3104(c)(1)(A)-(B) requires that foreign banks that
maintain retail deposit accounts with less than one hundred thousand dollars must have
deposit insurance which, in turn, means that foreign banks must establish a U.S. subsidi-
ary for this purpose. Id. The choice of corporate form (i.e. branch verses subsidiary)
places an extra burden on foreign banks who must spend more money for establishing
and operating a separately capitalized organization. Id. at 94. The non-tariff barriers arise
because
[t]he loan capacity of a subsidiary is always less than that of a branch because
this capacity is based on the capital of the lending organization. With a branch,
the organization is the entire foreign bank, whereas with a subsidiary it is the
subsidiary standing alone.. . . Similarly, a branch can engage in a larger vol-
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banking policies through multilateral negotiations will, at the least, indi-
rectly affect America's bilaterally negotiated financial service agree-
ments.334 Secondly, the interdependence of global financial markets, com-
pounded by their susceptibility to domination from "market-makers,"
greatly weakens the significance of bilateral policies. 335 Thirdly,
America's "most-favored nation" exemption in the Financial Service
Agreement greatly hampers the harmonization of accounting standards
for capital market risks that banks use on their balance sheet calcula-
tions.336 Fourthly, the multilateral negotiation's attention to providing in-
ter-territorial services might contribute to the development of incentives
to increase managerial supervision of derivative transactions and to re-
duce systemic risks in global markets. 337
A. The U.S. Preference for Bilateral Financial Service Agreements
America's previous dealings in financial service agreements have
fostered its skepticism about national treatment principles, which are the
exception and not the rule in international financial service
arrangements. 338
The major bilateral achievements in U.S. trade policies have contrib-
uted to America's marginalized participation 339 in the Financial Service
Agreement of the GATS. These developments encompass the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its positive contribution
to U.S. financial institutions, especially banks, competing in Mexican and
Canadian markets.340 NAFTA has also reciprocally expanded access to
ume of trading operations than a subsidiary because of the difference in capital.
This is important in the markets for foreign exchange, derivative products, and
interbank lending ....
Id. at 95. See also Treasury Sees Progress, But Continuing Barriers To U.S. Banking
Abroad, BANK POL'Y REPORT, Jan. 16, 1995, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BNKPOL File [hereinafter Treasury Sees Progress] (listing countries that de jure or de
facto discourage branches, including Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Poland, Russia, and
South Africa).
334. See infra notes 339-47 and accompanying text.
335. See infra notes 360-66 and accompanying text.
336. See infra notes 367-77 and accompanying text.
337. See infra notes 378-80 and accompanying text.
338. See generally Treasury Sees Progress, supra note 333, at 7.
339. See, e.g., Malaysia to Open Up Finance Sector Under WTO Deal, REuTERS,
ASIA-PACiFIC Bus. REP., Aug. 14. 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUAPB
File (noting how the European Union salvaged the Financial Service Agreement).
340. See id. (describing how U.S. financial firms can establish subsidiaries in Mex-
ico and Canada). See also Karen MacAllister, NAFTA: How the Banks in the United
States and Mexico Will Respond, 17 Hous. J. IN'"L L. 273, 292-94 (1994).
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the American banking market on a scheduled basis. 341 Moreover, there
exists a close connection between monitoring domestic regulatory devel-
opments and modifying the agreement.342 The structure of the Financial
Services Agreement in NAFTA demonstrates America's willingness to
participate in mutually beneficial trade arrangements that provide suffi-
cient opportunities for American financial firms.343
The U.S. Treasury Department also has been successful in negotia-
tions with specific Asian countries.3  The Department's one-to-one talks
have greatly improved the competitive positions of American banks in
Japan,345 China 346 and Taiwan.347
Significant strides have also been achieved through the GATS-based
negotiation process. While Argentina, 348 Australia,349 India,350 and the
Philippines35I have given some important concessions in financial and
341. See NAFTA, Art. 1404(1), Cross-Border Trade, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INT'L
ECON. RELATIONS, 1995 Doc. Supp. (Jacksons, Davey, & Sykes eds., 1995), at 628 (refer-
ring to restrictions on cross-border trading activities in Section B of each Party's Sched-
ule to Annex VII).
342. See, e.g., id. at 627 (quoting NAFTA Art. 1403(3), Establishment of Financial
Institutions). NAFTA Article 1403(3) provides as follows:
Subject to Annex 1403.3, at such time as the United States permits commercial
banks of another Party located in its territory to expand through subsidiaries or
direct branches into substantially all of the United States market, the Parties
shall review and assess market access provided by each Party in relation to the
principles in paragraphs 1 and 2 [of NAFTA Article 14031 with a view to
adopting arrangements permitting investors of another Party to choose the jurid-
ical form of establishment of commercial banks.
Id.
343. See Shuman, supra note 2, at 10-24 (describing America's willingness to par-
ticipate in negotiations, like NAFrA, that foster competition around price and quality of
financial services rather than legal constraints).
344. See, e.g., id. (noting the rise in U.S. banks' net income in Asian markets from
$381 million in 1987 to $1.6 billion in 1993).
345. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 325 (discussing initial success of the U.S.-Japan
Agreement on Financial Services).
346. See Shuman, supra note 2, at 10-24 (noting how American negotiators are us-
ing China's application to the WTO to garner financial service concessions, especially un-
derwriting and trading of local currency-denominated securities).
347. See generally Hsu Li-The, Taiwan: The ROC's Development Strategy at the
Turn of the Century, Bus. TAIWAN, Mar. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
348. See, e.g., Treasury Sees Progress, supra note 333 (commenting about the elimi-
nation of legal impediments for foreign financial firms' market access and operations).
349. See id. (commenting about the wholesale banks' business that allows the
branches of foreign banks).
350. See id. (offering some liberalization for foreign bank branches).
351. See id. (commenting about the modifications in establishing foreign bank oper-
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banking services, there still exists some major hurdles. Such hurdles in-
clude Brazil's constitutional prohibition on new foreign banks and its
freeze on foreign ownership of existing banks.352 Brazil, for example,
would have to alter its constitution to accommodate any level of national
treatment that would be acceptable to the U.S.353 Some countries still im-
pose a formal moratorium on new domestic (on-shore) banking licenses
that affect both domestic and foreign banks.
354
Variations in negotiation procedures and participants cannot be
downplayed in the success of these negotiations.35 5 Because financial ser-
vices are so diverse and present many problems for the formation of con-
sensus,356 they probably need an alternative schemata through which ne-
gotiations can take place. Congressional control of the trade process, the
President's ideological leanings, and coordination of policy objectives be-
tween domestic financial regulators support this hypothesis.
57
Differences between multilateral and bilateral negotiations have a
tremendous import to the development of an international derivative reg-
ulatory policy. As illustrated by the Basle Committee, the central banks
have made important contributions to the internationalization of banking
services, especially the stability of international financial markets.3 58 The
current GATS-based multilateral approach will modify the role of central
bankers in the further development of the Financial Service Agreement.3 59
ations and in allowing universal banking).
352. See id.
353. See id. (discussing Brazil's constitutional prohibition on the entry of new for-
eign banks and foreign ownership of existing institutions). See also Summers, supra note
325 (noting the Brazilian President's decree that allows foreign participation in Brazil's
financial institutions on a case-by-case basis).
354. See, e.g., Treasury Sees Progress, supra note 333 (noting that Chile, the Czech
Republic, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand still impose such a moratorium).
355. See generally Philip R. Trimble, Arms Control and International Negotiation
Theory, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 543, 549-65 (1989) (explaining different international negoti-
ation process). See also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 332, at 149-50 (discussing the role of
the executive branch and its agencies, as well as congressional agencies and committees,
in the negotiating process).
356. See, e.g., Hecker Testimony, supra note 330 (describing the role of U.S. private
sector officials in the Financial Service Agreement's negotiations for evaluating market
access and equal treatment proposals).
357. See generally I.M. DESTLER. AMEIuCAN TRADE POLmCS (3d ed., 1995).
358. See supra notes 291-300 and accompanying text.
359. See BtALA. supra note 291, at 261-63 (discussing the role of bank regulators in
the GATS framework for comparing regulatory inadequacies between countries).
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B. A Multilateral Financial Service Agreement Can Mitigate the
Influence of Wealthy Interests on Financial Markets
The presence of powerful monied interests in global financial mar-
kets can seriously undermine the enforceability of any financially-
oriented service agreement.3 60 The absence of a multilateral effort in-
creases the probability of such unenforceability. As with the GATT, the
participation of all WTO members in the Financial Service Agreement of
the GATS could safeguard international competitive pressures that can
prevent market domination by highly-capitalized players. 361
The overall improvement in economic welfare from the GATT 362
cannot compare to the potential economic gains from the international
trade of financial services. 363 Even though American firms can be consid-
ered the market leaders in the development of financial services market-
ing, their leadership position cannot adequately explain America's opposi-
tion to multilateral negotiations.36" America's behavior might be best
explained as the consequence of political and socioeconomic constraints.
The political constraint involves the influence of the European Com-
munity on the Basle Committee. As the previous part of this article de-
tailed, U.S. regulators have little influence on the Basle Committee's pro-
posals for capital market risk modeling. 365 America's refusal to fully
participate in the Financial Service Agreement may be construed as dip-
lomatic posturing while other international institutions are negotiating
360. See, e.g., Christian Tyler, Private View: The Man Who Broke the Bank of En-
gland, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 2, 1993, at 16 (describing how the speculation by
George Soros on foreign currency markets undermined the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism).
361. See, e.g., Tim Colebatch, Australia: No Need to Reach Out for That Blunt In-
strument - Economic Policy, THE AGE (Melbourne), June 29, 1994 (commenting about
the presence of 10 Soros fund managers on the "Financial World" top 100 rich list, the
vastness of their capital resources, the impact of their speculation on Australian economic
policy, and Professor Tobin's proposal for an international tax on foreign exchange
transactions).
362. See JACKSON ETr AL., supra note 332, at 6.
363. See, e.g., Mary Foster, GATT and Foreign Banking as a Trade in Service, in
INTERNATIONAL BANKING OPERATIONS AND PRACTICES: CURRENT DEVELOPmENTs 25 (1995)
(commenting about the volume of international transactions in banking activity).
UNCTAD reports that trade in financial services is growing twice as quickly as trade in
goods. Id. See also Kenneth Silverstein, GATS Battle Tests Barriers to Global Financial
Competition, CoRs'. CASH.FLOW MAG., Aug. 1995, at 37 (describing how financial services
accounted for more than $450 billion or 7% of U.S. gross domestic product in 1994).
364. See WTO Proceeds with Interim Agreement After U.S. Withdraws, FIN. REG.
REP., July 1995 (discussing the combination of U.S. domestic interests and policy objec-
tives in limiting U.S. commitments to the Financial Service Agreement).
365. See infra notes 309-11 and accompanying text.
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new standards and policies that affect financial services. European sup-
port for the GATS and its need for American cooperation bolster this
contention.
One can assume that domestic and foreign financial institutions al-
ready operating within the U.S. have probably lobbied against the crea-
tion of a financial service agreement. As also detailed in Part IV, finan-
cial service interests have yet to form a consensus on regulatory
reform. 366 The uncertain impact that an international agreement would
have on transactions costs and compliance expenditures probably mobi-
lizes anti-GATS sentiments and accompanying lobbying efforts.
C. America's Refusal to Extend MFN Treatment for the Financial
Service Agreement Will Hamper Its Participation in the
Development of New Accounting Standards
The future liberalization of securities and banking services under-
scores the need for harmonized accounting standards between issuers and
intermediaries of financial services. 67 Without an international agreement,
domestic regulators368 and private agencies 69 will continue to add noise
to financial indicators. These indicators cover the basic components of a
firm's balance sheet and the information disseminated via rating agencies.
The information asymmetries between large and small players can
be greatly eliminated with an international agreement. Private accounting
agreements, like the FASB, have already be shown to be ineffectual in
the face of a Barings-type crisis.370 Financial service organizations are al-
ready subject to a gamut of these accounting treatments which are used
in the calculation of risk, capital adequacy, and overall financial sound-
ness.371 Sophisticated market participants have the resources to decipher
their differences and, perhaps, even exploit their variations. 372
366. See supra notes 319-24 and accompanying text.
367. See, e.g., International Accounting Standards Panel Accelerates Release of
Rules, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, April 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Li-
brary, BNAIBF File (describing the efforts of the Internal Accounting Standards Commit-
tee (IASC) to produce a set of accounting rules for cross-border stock offerings).
368. See, e.g., id. (also describing the pressure from the SEC and the New York
Stock Exchange to accelerate IASC schedule, especially rules on financial instruments
and investments).
369. See, e.g., Some Rating Agencies Give Higher Grades, WALL ST. J., May 15,
1996, at C17 (commenting about a New York Federal Reserve Bank study about varia-
tions between rating agencies).
370. See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
371. Id.
372. See Gary L. Gastineau & Louis I. Margolis, The Future of Equity Derivatives:
What Lies Ahead?, FIN. ANALYST J., Nov/Dec 1994 (discussing market making positions
1997]
196 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
Internationalization of global equity markets also warrants a multi-
lateral agreement that encourages the harmonization of accounting stan-
dards. 373 Foreign firms are increasingly looking to foreign investors for
new capital resources. 374 Variations in accounting standards between do-
mestic and foreign countries for issuers of these securities can lead to
some bizarre results.375 Moreover, the selection of rule-makers of ac-
counting standards and their political obligations could marginalize the
importance of international influences on accounting standards and
procedures.376
An international agreement that can greatly assist the harmonization
of accounting standards will benefit the overall world economy. The
trade in derivative financial products will be a major recipient of such
improvements. The enhanced stability from uniform accounting standards
for derivatives will increase the liquidity of these products and will
strengthen their markets. Most importantly, a sound and safe expansion
of the derivatives market might encourage smaller investor participation
and wider applications of such financial products.
377
D. Why Current Policies Toward Increased Management
Participation in Policing the Risks of Their Firm's
Financial Products Necessitate a Multilateral Agreement
The role of management in derivatives crises has attracted much at-
tention. 378 Many proposals for derivative regulation, as well as banking
and how larger participants trade more aggressively than smaller investors).
373. See International Accounting Standards Panel Accelerates Release of Rules,
supra note 367.
374. See, e.g., Peter Gumbel & Greg Steinmetz, German Firms Shift to More-Open
Accounting, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1995, at 1 (explaining how German corporations are
adopting international accounting standards to attract international investors).
375. See Michelson, supra note 256 (describing Diamler-Benz American loss and
German profit figures).
376. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 258 (describing selection process for FASB).
377. See, e.g., Danielle Bochove, Greatest Derivatives Threat Is Customer Igno-
rance, R uTrERs, BC CYcLE, Oct. 18, 1995 (copy on file with author) (citing the need for
customers to understand the derivatives-related risks and their clearinghouse
arrangements).
378. See, e.g., FIA Task Force Releases Financial Integrity Recommendations, BNA
INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, June 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, Itrade Library, BNAIBF
File. Amongst the Futures Industry Association's recommendations for the financial integ-
rity of global futures markets, the task force discovered that the agreements between bro-
kers/dealers and their customers should clearly delineate rights and obligations. Id. More-
over, firms should be more diligent in collecting customer margin requirements and in
assessing the risks of market exchanges and their products. Id.
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reform, utilize the role of management supervision in preventing transac-
tional abuses and operational inefficiencies. 379 Such new policies have en-
couraged the development of less government-intrusive and more market-
oriented regulations.8 0
Even though the U.S. has embraced similar policies with the FRB's
pre-commitment approach for banks' derivative activities, American re-
fusal to participate in multilateral negotiations will hamper its contribu-
tions to further development of such policies. The liberalization of finan-
cial services and its impact on domestic regulatory policies warrant a
multilateral effort to ensure the free-flow of ideas and information about
policy alternatives as well as the free-flow of financial services and
products.
The impact of the GATS on banking and related financial services
will greatly limit systemic risks in global markets. Product information
will travel more quickly across borders and between institutions. In-
creased competition between financial service providers will also serve to
enhance the soundness of firms and their services, as consumers will
have greater access to choice in the marketplace.
Another potential consequence of a multilateral financial service
agreement will be the commercialization of the derivative products mar-
ket. Perhaps, the increased competition between international banks might
influence innovations in the derivative market, such as offering specula-
tive products for use amongst regular banking customers.
VI. A GATS-BASED CLEARINGHOUSE FOR DERIVATIVE TRANSACrIONS
The potential gains and losses from derivative products, as well as
the attendant risks to global finance markets, warrant special considera-
tion in the negotiation for the financial service agreement of the GATS.
This consideration includes building upon the consensus about the need
for some form of international derivative regulations. As mentioned
throughout this article, several factors, including conflicting financial in-
terests, the complexity of financial products, and international competi-
379. See, e.g., Simon Louisson, NZ Central Bank to Use Disclosure to Monitor
Banks, REUTERS, BC CYCLE, May 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, Bankg Library,
CURNWS File (referring to Barings rogue trader, Leeson, as an impetus for New Zea-
land's deregulated banking program). The hallmark of this program is its dependence on
public disclosure statements that increase incentives for bank directors, who are legally
responsible for their contents, to monitor and to manage their risks more prudently. Id.
380. See id. (noting how U.S. regulatory compliance costs comprise approximately
14% of their non-interest cost). See also Survey, A Novel Bank Statement, THE ECONO-
MIST, Apr. 27, 1996, at S31 (commenting about New Zealand's program and its impact on
competition between banks for customers/depositors).
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tive pressures, preclude the development of substantive-related derivative
regulations. A possible procedural regulatory solution that utilizes the les-
sons from the Barings Crisis is the creation of a subsidiary body by the
GATT Council of Trade. Such a body, envisaged as a GATS-based
clearinghouse, could provide an alternative international payment system
through which derivative transactions could be cleared and conducted in
every major exchange market.3"'
A. Clearinghouses and Their Current Function in International
Transactions
A clearinghouse is the focal point of all major international payment
systems because it is the system's component that settles all transac-
tions. 382 The success of clearinghouses has been firmly established in the
banking community as payment orders, generated by either checks or
electronic funds media, are sent around the world.383 A major contribu-
tion of a clearinghouse is the stability and reduction in risks that it pro-
vides to any financial transaction.384
Financial intermediaries use clearinghouses to conduct many inter-
territorial transactions, such as settling accounts on exchange markets, or
other similar types of business dealings. 385 Banks, for example, greatly
depend on a clearinghouse in both domestic and international opera-
tions. 386 Clearinghouses, such as CHIPS or FEDWIRE, also decrease the
risks of default by the contracting parties. 387
All major exchanges employ some form of a clearinghouse to settle
accounts.388 The successful operation of such clearinghouse mechanisms
381. See James T. Moser, What is Multilateral Clearing and Who Cares?, CHIC.
FED. LE'TrER, Nov. 1994, at 1-3. "Clearing is the back-office processing of traded con-
tracts. It involves determining the amounts due between counterparties and, through cash
transfers, settling these amounts." Id.
382. See generally ERNEST T. PATRIKIS ET AL., WIRE TRANSFER: A GUIDE TO U.S.
AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS GOVERNING FUNDS TRANSFER (1993).
383. See, e.g., id., at 238 (evaluating a UNCITRAL Working Group's effort on har-
monizing credit transfers through a model law that mirrors Art. 4A of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code).
384. See, e.g., Exchanges Must Examine Clearinghouse Risk, Says Moody's, WALL
ST. LETrER, June 26, 1995, at 8 (commenting about how competition between clearing-
houses for business from futures and options exchanges affect their guarantees on trades).
Clearinghouses with sufficient risk management policies could either prevent or en-
courage a Barings-type disaster. Id.
385. See id.
386. See PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 382, at 238-40.
387. See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
388. See, e.g., Exchanges Must Examine Clearinghouse Risk, Says Moody's, supra
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involve many agreements between private associations389 as well as some
government supervision.319 Moreover, the significance of clearinghouses
to derivative transactions has been fully revealed by the Barings Crisis.391
Regardless of how and when the Financial Service Agreement is imple-
mented by all contracting parties of the GATS, it will most likely affect
the operations and functions of clearinghouses and their functions in
global payment systems.
The existing GATS treaty has empowered the Council of Trade to
"establish subsidiary bodies as it considers appropriate for effective dis-
charge of its functions. 3 92 Thus, the creation of a clearinghouse within
the GATS is not outside the legal boundaries of the treaty.3 93 This
clearinghouse should have the capacity to handle both exchange-traded
and OTC derivative products.394 Derivatives dealers and end-users can in-
fluence their national governments through this multilateral effort and can
collectively develop an appropriate clearing system.3 95
Derivatives, unlike other financial services, represent a new service
technology that is outside the purview of existing domestic and interna-
note 384, at 8 (noting that the Board of Trade Clearing Corporation is the Chicago Board
of Trade's clearing arm).
389. See, e.g., Futures Marts, Clearing Entities Sign Memorandum of Understand-
ing, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Mar. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, Itrade Library,
BNAIBF File [hereinafter Futures Marts] (discussing information-sharing agreement be-
tween 45 futures exchanges and clearing entities to prevent another Barings crisis).
390. See Coggan, supra note 91, at 5.
391. See supra Part IV.B.
392. See GATS, Art. XXIV(1), Council for Trade in Services, in LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF INT'L ECON. RELATIONS, 1995 Doc. Supp. (Jackson, Davey, & Sykes eds., 1995), at
321 [hereinafter 1995 Doc. Supp.]. GATS Article XXIV(1) states as follows:
The Council for Trade in Services shall carry out such functions as may be as-
signed to it to facilitate the operation of this Agreement and further its objec-
tives. The Council may establish such subsidiary bodies as it considers appro-
priate for the effective discharge of its functions.
Id. (emphasis added). The Council for Trade in Services represents a component of the
World Trade Organization's governing structure. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 332, at
304.
393. See 1995 Doc. Supp., at 321; see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 332, at 304.
394. See, e.g., Vera Young, Margin Financing in SIB's Crosshairs After Sumitomo
Scandal, DERivATIvES WK., July 29, 1996, at 1 (discussing the role of OTC derivatives in
the Sumitomo copper trading debacle through converting OTC positions into exchange-
traded contracts). See also Moser, supra note 382, at 2 (noting CBOT's development of
the Hybrid Instruments Trading System (HITS) that will offer multilateral clearing facili-
ties to OTC swap contracts).
395. The GATS-based clearinghouse constitutes a policy idea that is designed to
stimulate debate on international derivatives regulation. Its structure, along with its rules,
procedures, and technical operations, are well-beyond the scope of this article.
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tional regulatory agencies. These products' infinite permutations require
some supervision from international agencies. 96 A GATS-based clearing-
house will provide a means to collect and monitor information about
product risks and valuations. This information might lead to greater cer-
tainty about the "true" risk such products pose to the global economy.
Moreover, an uniform mechanism, such as a GATS-based clearing-
house, will decrease transaction costs in derivative transactions. The
economies of scale from a single clearing mechanism will produce sav-
ings and encourage further innovations in product developments. Moreo-
ver, more countries and their financial service consumers will have im-
proved access to derivatives markets for speculative or hedging
purposes.3 97 This access can be crucial to Third World nations whose
need for new capital resources might be handled through increased access
to global financial markets.3 98 A fully-developed GATS-based clearing-
house has the potential to achieve such benefits.
As compared with previous efforts in banking and securities, the
scale of this multilateral proposal for the derivatives market could in-
crease capital mobility and remove uncertainty about complex prod-
ucts.399 The international effort beyond such a modified clearing system
could produce infinite benefits. All financial intermediaries, regardless of
their home country's level of development, would have access to the
same technology and software upon which the GATS clearing facility
would operate. Uniform technologies would further contribute to the ben-
efits from the economies of scale. Also, the international cooperation
396. See, e.g., Gastineau & Margolis, supra note 372, at 9-11 (commenting how
regulation delays future derivative developments through promoting higher cost, lower
volume products). For example, if the SEC prohibited stock index futures, then derivative
participants would have developed similar products with a regulatory-evasive structure.
Id. (conjecturing about an alternative S&P 500 futures contract that would have been
traded in London or other foreign market).
397. See, e.g., Anne Schwimmer, World Bank Leads Effort for Swaps Clearinghouse
- Proposes Pilot Program with Major Dealers, INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIG., Dec. 20,
1993, at 5 (describing World Bank's support for an international swaps clearinghouse to
increase Third World country access to financial markets).
398. Id. See also Venezuelan Brokerage Calls For Creating of Clearinghouse, DE-
RIVATIVES WK., June 17, 1996, at 4 (discussing Venezuelan efforts to overcome liquidity
problems and information deficiencies through creating a clearinghouse for futures con-
tracts). Venzeualan brokers and bankers realize that their local financial markets cannot
successfully compete for international capital without providing derivative products. Id.
399. See Moser, supra note 381, at 2-3 (illustrating the benefits of multilateral clear-
inghouses through their centralized, information-gathering functions). The clearinghouse
provides fully-estimated potential default values that enable accurate calculations about
derivative-related risks.
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within the GATS might encourage greater liberalization of trade in finan-
cial services.
B. The Mitigation of Potential Opposition to the GATS-Based
Clearinghouse Through A Gradual Implementation
Procedure
Every major financial exchange either has its own clearing proce-
dures or has developed cooperative agreements with similar systems. 400
Those functioning clearing systems over which private associations and
government regulations have established managerial autonomy will
strongly oppose such an international effort. The reduction in autonomy
for such organizations can be overcome with the gradual integration of a
GATS-based clearinghouse into derivative markets. While the short-term
costs of maintaining a dual system, consisting of existing exchange clear-
ing mechanisms and a GATS-based mechanism, may appear prohibitive,
the long-term benefits warrant such increased costs.
Financial intermediaries should have the option to handle derivative
transactions in either payment system. The short-term adjustment costs
will be ultimately passed to the financial consumer who can then alter
short-term trading strategies accordingly.
The creation of a permanent dispute resolution panel within the
WTO demonstrates the organization's capacity to resolve conflicts be-
tween national economic policies with international trade obligations.401
A new clearing facility can serve similar supranational policy functions
and can liberalize the trade in derivative services and products.
In addition, a GATS-based clearinghouse can further develop new
derivative policies, such as the participation of financial firms' manage-
ment in reducing systemic risks in derivative markets. For example, the
clearinghouse might reward members who diligently police their deriva-
tive operations with reduced margin requirements or similar economic in-
centives. National governments might also be enticed to grant tax incen-
tives or other economic inducements to firms that use the GATS-based
system.
400. See, e.g., Futures Marts, supra note 389 (listing major derivative exchanges
and their clearing facilities).
401. Hearing on The World Trade Organization and U.S. Sovereignty, Hearing
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., (1994) (statement of John H. Jackson, Hes-
sel E. Yotema Professor of Law, University of Michigan), reprinted in FEDERAL Docu-
MENT CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, June 14, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, ARCNWS File.
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As the GATT has been able to deal with all areas that affect the free
trade of goods, the GATS, through originating a clearinghouse and ac-
companying rules and procedures, can deal with international derivative
transactions that affect all aspects of global finance. A GATS-based
clearinghouse represents a notion from which further debate on interna-
tional derivative regulations can further evolve.
VII. CONCLUSION
International derivative transactions represent convoluted profit op-
portunities for highly specialized and capitalized investors. The confusion
about their role in financial transactions has been carefully nurtured by
all market participants who play this "zero-sum game." Unlike other fi-
nancial services that increase overall wealth, derivatives, in any form,
shift wealth between market participants. These shifts occur primarily be-
tween wealthy individuals, financial firms, and governments. The multi-
trillion dollar nature of these activities indicate the success of the status
quo and the opposition to meaningful market reforms.
This article's analysis has focused on the influence of derivative
players on international regulatory reforms in light of the recent highly-
publicized scandals. The existing institutions, both government and pri-
vate, as well as their policies, will not produce far-reaching reforms for
the derivative markets. The complexity of derivatives, compounded by
non-uniform financial interests, contribute to the ineffectiveness of gov-
emment regulation to prevent similar Barings-type crises. Thus, regula-
tory reform should focus on the least market-intrusive component of de-
rivative products, that is, their settlement operations.
The potential benefits from harmonizing the operational procedures
for derivative products should lead to greater market access for ordinary
investors and developing countries. Standardized futures contracts, for ex-
ample, significantly expanded the volume of exchange-traded products.
Similarly, standardized operational guidelines should expand and, per-
haps, commercialize derivative markets. Without more user-friendly
guidelines on an international level, derivative products will not become
mainstream financial products. Instead, they will continue to benefit a
fortunate few.
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